Safe Food_ Bacteria, Biotechnology, and Bioterrorism - Marion Nestle [43]
Thus, the USDA’s friendliness to food producers has a long history. Indeed, one reason for the friendliness is built into the system of governmental oversight. The USDA reports to congressional agriculture committees whose most powerful members frequently come from states and districts economically dependent on food processing and production. That in itself might not be a problem, but for decades, food producers, USDA staff, and members of the House and Senate agriculture committees constituted what was universally understood to be the “agricultural establishment.” These groups firmly controlled farm policy through seniority appointments to agriculture committees that appeared to grant lifetime tenure. The classic example was that of Representative Jamie Whitten (Dem-MS), who chaired House agricultural appropriations committees for so long (1949 to 1992) that he was known as the “permanent USDA Secretary.”1 Although the overwhelming representation of industry interests on congressional agriculture committees lessened somewhat in recent years, the tradition continues. In 1991, for example, 90% of the members of the Senate agricultural committee came from states in which at least 20% of the entire labor force was employed in food production.2 Such percentages alone explain why congressional committees might be more concerned about the interests of food producers and processors than about protecting public health and why they insist that the USDA follow this approach.
A second reason for the friendliness is the revolving door between government and industry. Job exchanges between industry lobbyists and the USDA are especially common, not least because 500 or so department officials are political appointees selected on the basis of party affiliation. As early as 1974, reports identified numerous USDA officials who were previously employed by the meat and dairy industries or who left the USDA to work for those industries. From 1980 to 1992, the secretaries of the USDA included in succession a hog farmer, a former president of a meat industry trade association, and a cattle rancher—all more likely to grant higher priority to the business concerns of meat producers than to the safety concerns of the public. The change in administration in 2001 continued this tradition. The new USDA secretary, Ann Veneman, appointed a lobbyist for the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association as her chief of staff. The former USDA secretary, Dan Glickman, took a position with a law firm that lobbies for food and agriculture companies; although he may not personally have represented such clients, his presence in the firm gave an impression favorable to their interests.3
A third reason for the friendliness of the USDA to the industries it regulates has to do with congressional campaign contributions. The Center for Public Integrity, a group that tracks relationships between industry and Congress, provides lists of Senate and House members who receive the largest campaign contributions from various industries. From 1987 to 1996, contributions from meat and poultry groups seemed particularly well focused. Among senators, 18 of the leading 25 recipients of contributions from meat and poultry groups were members of the agriculture committee, and one was Senate majority leader. Of the 25 leading House recipients from such groups, 17 were agriculture committee members and one was the Speaker. The center reports similar patterns among contributions from grocery distributors, wholesalers, and retailers. It also notes that among 153 witnesses at House and Senate agriculture committee hearings during that decade, 59 were from industry while just 16 were from public interest groups. One reason for this imbalance may be that the committees do not enjoy hearing the complaints of consumer advocates about USDA’s conflicts of interest or its failure to enforce reasonable