Safe Food_ Bacteria, Biotechnology, and Bioterrorism - Marion Nestle [58]
USDA’S POLITICAL BATTLES
In contrast, and rather a surprise in view of its past history, the USDA moved quickly to introduce HACCP under the more consumer-friendly leadership appointed by President Bill Clinton. By the mid-1990s, some segments of the meat industry were asking the department to institute HACCP regulations, if for no other reason than to reassure the public that meat was safe. The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) began to develop HACCP rules for meat and poultry through a method previously unimaginable for this agency: it openly consulted stakeholders. The FSIS held information briefings, scientific conferences, public hearings, federal and state conferences, agency meetings, and a professional forum to listen to points of view. Its 1995 proposed rules differed from those of the FDA in several critical respects, most notably in their emphasis on requirements for pathogen testing. Indeed, the department called the plan Pathogen Reduction: HACCP—a critical distinction. The USDA plan established performance standards and required the companies to prove by daily sampling and testing that pathogenic contaminants did not exceed levels specified in the standards.5
True to form, some meat industry groups objected. An official of the Armour company, for example, told a congressional committee that HACCP was an imperfect system that did not address the real problem—consumer education: “There is a concern that HACCP has been oversold and public expectations may be unrealistically high. In particular, HACCP cannot guarantee the absence of enteric pathogens on raw meat or poultry. . . . Food safety is a shared responsibility involving industry, Government, and consumers. Public education on safe handling of foods continues to be a key factor in preventing foodborne illness.”6
Untrue to form, the American Meat Institute petitioned the USDA to require HACCP for all meat and poultry plants: “We believe so strongly in HACCP’s benefits for meat and poultry safety that we think it should be mandated for our segment of the industry.” This group’s unexpected support of HACCP is explained by its assumption—erroneous, as it happened—that industry inspectors would replace those of USDA. Later, when meat industry associations realized the implications of pathogen testing—that products found contaminated would be considered adulterated and unfit to sell—they tried to block the proposals. Meat producers and processors much preferred a “virtual” safety system: HACCP without pathogen reduction and entirely voluntary compliance.7
Congress Demands “Negotiated Rulemaking,” 1995
Before proposed regulations become final and go into effect, they are supposed to be held open for a specified period of time for public comment. The comment period for the proposed Pathogen Reduction: HACCP rules occurred at a time when especially conservative Republicans had taken control of Congress and were attempting to reduce regulatory burdens on industry. Meat and poultry lobbyists took advantage of this favorable situation to urge Congress to block the proposed rules. They used the usual argument: home cooks are responsible for most episodes of foodborne illness, and oversight of industry is unnecessary. Despite the false premise (most outbreaks derive from foods prepared outside the home), the lobbying succeeded in several respects. First, Congress extended the comment period to give the industry more time to organize opposition. Next, industry lobbyists convinced some members of Congress to amend the appropriations bill to delete funding for HACCP implementation. Finally, while discussions of this funding amendment were in progress, the lobbyists also convinced Congress