Safe Food_ Bacteria, Biotechnology, and Bioterrorism - Marion Nestle [60]
At this point, Mr. Walsh suddenly withdrew his amendment, attributing this surprising retreat to a revelation that Congress could in fact work out its differences with the USDA: “We got the personal commitment of the secretary to create the dialogue we sought.”14 Alternative explanations seem more likely, however. Pressure from advocacy groups was surely a factor, especially a campaign organized by the families of children who became ill or died after eating contaminated hamburger. Advocates took credit for the amendment’s withdrawal as a “resounding victory for public health and an unmasking defeat of good ol’ boy politics.” This last was a reference to press accounts that Mr. Walsh had accepted $66,000 in donations from meat and agricultural interests.15 It also seems likely that members of Congress, not wanting to be viewed as destroyers of public health and killers of innocent children, suggested that Mr. Walsh would face a difficult floor fight if he pursued his anti-HACCP agenda. Ultimately, the Dole bill also failed to pass. Thus, one unanticipated—and positive—result of Mr. Walsh’s amendment was to unite food safety advocates and encourage them to press for an independent food agency that would not be subject to such crass political pressures, an issue discussed in greater detail in chapter 4.16
The Last Attempts to Derail HACCP, 1995–1996
With the demise of the Walsh amendment, the USDA released the nearly 200 pages of “final” rules for Pathogen Reduction: HACCP for meat and poultry products. As with the earlier drafts, these would need to be made available for public comment before going into effect in July 1996. The rules required large firms to develop, install, and implement HACCP plans by the beginning of 1998, small firms by 1999, and very small firms by 2000. To help companies figure out how to proceed, the department created 13 model plans and provided detailed instructions for developing and using them (figure 5 in chapter 2 is based on one such model).17 The published Pathogen Reduction: HACCP rules revealed that political pressures succeeded in achieving at least one compromise. Although the USDA originally wanted meat and poultry companies to be responsible for Salmonella testing, it now said that federal inspectors would test for Salmonella “on an unannounced basis.” Companies would have to test for the generic form of E. coli (as a marker of fecal contamination) in just a small number of samples: 1 out of every 300 beef carcasses, 1,000 hogs, 3,000 turkeys, and 22,000 chickens.5
This time, meat processors used the comment period to press Congress to eliminate requirements for Salmonella testing. Their congressional sympathizers introduced an amendment to the Farm Bill that would create an “independent” oversight panel of food, meat, and poultry scientists with broad powers to review FSIS decisions on HACCP procedures, standards, and practices. The amendment required the USDA to submit proposed rules to the panel and then allow 90 days for public comment. At the very least, this plan would further delay the regulations. The policy director of the House Agriculture Committee explained that the purpose of the panel was scientific: “The H.A.C.C.P. rule is purported to be science-based, but it seemed clear that some of the regulatory decisions have no scientific validity. The regulations should never have gotten to this stage.”18 Reporters, however, viewed the panel as yet another political tactic to allow the meat industry to avoid having to test for pathogens. Eventually, this amendment failed to get enough votes to be included in the final bill.
Sorting out the political forces for and against Pathogen Reduction: HACCP is especially complicated because