School Choice or Best Systems_ What Improves Education_ - Margaret C. Wang [24]
Table 3-2 PARENT REPORTS OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS AT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS SERVING VOUCHER PARTICIPANTS IN NEW YORK CITY, DAYTON, AND WASHINGTON, DC
SOURCE: Adapted from Paul E. Peterson, “Thorough and Efficient Private and Public Schools,” in Courting Failure, ed. Erik A. Hanushek (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univeristy Education Next Press, 2006).
Problem Private School % Public School %
Fighting 32 63
Truancy 26 48
Tardiness 33 54
Cheating 26 39
Table 3-3 PARENT REPORTS OF SCHOOL OUTREACH BY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS SERVING VOUCHER PARTICIPANTS IN NEW YORK CITY, DAYTON, AND WASHINGTON, DC
SOURCE: Adapted from Paul E. Peterson, “Thorough and Efficient Private and Public Schools,” in Courting Failure, ed. Erik A. Hanushek (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univeristy Education Next Press, 2006).
Outreach Private School % Public School %
Parents receive notes from teachers 93 78
Parents receive newsletters about the school 88 68
Parents are notified when child is sent to office for first time because of disruptive behavior 93 78
Parents are informed about student progress halfway through the grading period 93 84
Low-income students in Milwaukee were first able to use vouchers in the 1990-91 school year. Since participation was initially limited to only 1 percent of Milwaukee’s enrollment, many were denied admission. After eight years of dispute about the cap for the program, policymakers raised the ceiling to 15 percent (about 14,700 students) of Milwaukee’s total enrollment in public schools. Poor families are eligible to apply for vouchers (but are not guaranteed to receive them) if their income is at or below 175 percent of the federal poverty level ($17,463 for a family of four in 1999-2000), an amount roughly equal to the income eligibility threshold for free and reduced-price school lunches.
A case study of Milwaukee’s public schools showed that the district made program decisions that likely account for its improved academic performance. After participation in the voucher program was raised to 15 percent of public school enrollment, the public school system closed its six worst schools, developed more early childhood and full-day kindergarten programs, expanded before-and after-school programs from 1 to 82 from 1995 to 2001, and opened several new charter schools.20
Florida provides another setting for the study of the market effects of vouchers or even the threat of vouchers. Until a court struck it down in January 2006, the statewide A+ program graded schools on an achievement scale from A to F and provided vouchers to students to use at other private or public schools if their school received two Fs in any four-year period. Four independent evaluations of Florida’s program each concluded that the program improved the performance of public schools.
An early detailed analysis conducted in 2001 by Greene indicated that student achievement improved at a faster rate in schools that received an F.21 Greene’s research, using school-level achievement data, showed that academic test results were not significantly different among schools that received grades of A, B, or C. Schools that received a D, however, showed some improvement, and schools designated as failing demonstrated the greatest gains in test scores.
Greene and Winters22 studied Florida’s A+ program in 2004 and reached similar conclusions:
The schools facing either the prospect or the reality of vouchers made substantial gains compared with the results achieved by the rest of Florida’s public schools. They also made strong gains relative to those earned by schools serving similar student populations, which nonetheless