Ship of Ghosts - James D. Hornfischer [234]
CHAPTER 10 (pp. 71 to 81)
“Am proceeding to intercept…”: USS John D. Edwards, Action Report, 2. Rooks’s “hurried but deadly serious” conference: Winslow, The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait, 112. Lamade would return stateside as an instructor at NAS Jacksonville. Later he went aboard the USS Hancock as Commander of Air Group Seven, striking at Japan. He named his fighter plane T. Benny in honor of the Houston’s senior aviator, Thomas B. Payne; Schultz, The Last Battle Station, 129. Doorman’s formation departing Surabaya: Parkin, Out of the Smoke, 216; cf. Winslow, The Ghost That Died, 113, who wrote, “Such an unorthodox deployment of forces suggested that Doorman knew little about proven naval tactics, or chose to ignore them.” Winslow did not account for the nagging mechanical problems of the destroyers. The British Admiralty’s Battle of the Java Sea (Battle Summary No. 28) (fn. on 16) states the U.S. destroyer commander (Commander Binford) wanted the cruisers to scout for the destroyers in advance of any torpedo attack. “A tactical instrument of collective genius…”: Hughes, Fleet Tactics, 74. Communications within Doorman’s squadron: Morison, History of United States Naval Operations, Vol. 3, 342; but Winslow, at 113, says a Dutch liaison officer on the Houston translated the orders, though he too mentions Lt. Otto Kolb on Doorman’s staff on the De Ruyter, 124 fn., without explanation of his duties; see also Schultz, 143. “Everyone knows that you cannot assemble eleven football players…”: Hamlin, “The Houston’s Last Battles,” 10. “One cruiser, large destroyers, number unknown…”: Van Oosten, Battle of the Java Sea, 46; British Admiralty, Battle Summary, 77. “Two battleships, one cruiser, six destroyers…”: British Admiralty, Battle Summary, 77; Winslow, The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait, 113; Parkin, Out of the Smoke, 216–217. Enemy bearings: USS John D. Ford and USS John D. Edwards action reports. “We realized help would come, but not today…”: Marvin Robinson, UNT interview, 15. HMS Electra “twisting like a hare”: Cain, HMS Electra, 221–222. The predicament about fleet air cover was reflected by Admiral Helfrich, who stated: “All my previous requests for fighter protection had been refused. The lack of cooperation in this instance shows clearly that the fleet and the aircraft operating over the sea must be under the same command”: British Admiralty, Battle of the Java Sea, 24, fn. 1. Regarding air reconnaissance reports, the British Admiralty further reports: “In order to minimize the delay attendant on the centralized system adopted by the [Dutch] Reconnaissance Group at Bandoeng, RADM Doorman urgently requested the Naval Seaplane Base at Moro-Krambagan, Surabaya to repeat to him immediately all reports made by Reconnaissance Group flying boat pilots to their headquarters at Bandoeng. However, since ABDAair and Recgroup (although they…[were] both at Bandoeng) [had] been separated, it frequently happened that reconnaissance signals only…[reached Doorman] after great delay”: British Admiralty, 15. Report of the U.S. air attack on troop transports: Army Air Forces, “Summary of Air Action,” 241–242. “Our first shots were fired almost ahead…”: Hamlin, “The Houston’s Last Battles,” 11. “Jesus Christ, you just can’t imagine…”: James W. Huffman, interview with the author. “This is a thing that you couldn’t do in peacetime…”: Hamlin, “USS Houston in Battle of Java Sea,” 1. “Near-miss underwater well aft”: Capt. Oliver Gordon in HMS