Short History of World War II - James L. Stokesbury [168]
Rommel, drawing on his experience in the desert, wanted to concentrate forward on the invasion beaches and defeat the British and Americans as they came ashore. He believed that it would be impossible to move reserves long distances under Allied air supremacy, and therefore, that if the Allies once did get firmly ashore, they were there to stay. It was Rommel who made the now famous remark that the first day of the invasion would be “the longest day,” and he believed that if the battle were not fought and won in the first day, it would not be won at all.
The flaw in this reasoning, and it was one readily apparent to the more conventional von Rundstedt, was that you could not concentrate on the invasion beaches unless you knew which beaches were going to be invaded. Once again the Germans were up against the mobility of Allied sea power, and if they followed Rommel’s reasoning about the way to meet the invasion, but met it at the wrong place, disaster would result. To further von Rundstedt in his ideas, he had never fought a campaign against an enemy possessing unchallenged air superiority, so he had little idea of what that would mean. He believed that reserves could be moved forward, and that the logical, conventional thing to do was to keep them well back and well in hand until the landing was thoroughly underway. Then when the Allies had passed their point of no return, the reserves could be committed for a climactic battle that would destroy the invaders.
This difference of opinion, fundamental as it was, was further complicated by Hitler. He insisted on final control over the release of reserves, so it was conceivable that not only would they not be located forward as Rommel wanted, but they would not even be available when von Rundstedt wanted. In fact, Hitler’s intuition, cleverly aided by the Allied deception plan, told him that the landing would come in the Pas de Calais; until it did, everything else could be disregarded as a plot to lure the reserves away from that vital stretch of coastline. As the invasion neared, it was obvious to the Germans only that they were not ready for it. That, of course, was not obvious to the Allies.
To run the invasion, the Allies brought Eisenhower back from North Africa as Supreme Commander. Montgomery left 8th Army in Italy and came home as Ground Force Commander, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay was the naval commander, and Air Vice-Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory led the air forces. A great deal of politics was involved in the appointment of the commanders, especially in the choice of Eisenhower as the overall leader. The American Chief of Staff, General Marshall, had hoped to lead this climactic campaign of the war; so equally had the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Alan Brooke. Both were too involved in worldwide matters to be spared, however, so the burden—and the opportunity—fell on Eisenhower, who had already demonstrated in the Mediterranean his ability as a military manager.
When Eisenhower and Montgomery arrived in Britain they were shown plans to land three divisions over the beaches, and two by air behind the enemy defenses. Both immediately said they wanted three by air, and five over the beach. The result of this upgrading, to which the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed, was an increase of shipping and resources, and that in turn pushed the date for the southern France invasion