Short History of World War II - James L. Stokesbury [171]
In its initial phases this schedule went well awry. The German reaction to the invasion, once they finally decided this was actually it, was stronger than expected. In spite of the air interdiction and the efforts of the French Forces of the Interior, heavy reinforcements reached Normandy, and it soon became obvious that the Germans proposed to give battle, if not on the beaches, at least well forward, in front of Caen and along the approaches to Cherbourg. As Ground Force Commander in the immediate post-landing stage, Montgomery directed the British and Canadians to take Caen, and the Americans to take Cherbourg. The former he regarded as the communications key to the latter, and the latter was necessary because the Allies badly needed a port. The supply capacity of the Mulberry harbors was limited and was lessened even more by a series of storms that damaged them soon after they were created.
Toward both objectives the Allies made heavy going. The Germans committed most of their armored reserves around Caen, and their heavy Tiger tanks took an impressive toll of the British and Canadian Shermans. The battle for Caen degenerated into a regular slugging match. Farther to the west the Americans made relatively slow progress in the bad country of the bocage. Over the centuries the frugal Norman farmers had hedged their little fields diligently. Now each field, of a few hundred square yards, was surrounded with living banks of hedges bordering sunken dirt lanes. Each hedgerow became a minor fortress. Tanks trying to climb the banks would expose their bellies to German anti-tank weapons; soldiers attempting to worm their way through the hedges would be picked off by machine-gun nests. The Americans were forced to fight their way forward yard by yard in platoon-and company-sized catch-as-catch-can operations.
Nonetheless, they persevered and on June 18 they reached the south coast of the Normandy Peninsula at Barneville. Cherbourg was cut off, and the Germans could not reopen a way to it. Von Rundstedt massed his armor at Caen, hoping to drive toward Cherbourg, but the pressure exerted by the British kept him tied down, and by the 20th the Americans were in the outer suburbs of Cherbourg. The Germans resisted calls to surrender, and a bitter fight for the city lasted until the 27th. So thoroughly had the Germans done their demolition work that it was well into August before the port facilities were reopened at all.
But by the end of June, with Cherbourg secured, the Allies were ready to turn eastward. The Americans began to shift their forces around, away from Cherbourg toward the south, preparatory for a huge left wheel. Both Rommel and von Rundstedt could see it coming, and they pleaded with Hitler for more reserves. He still held major forces north of the Seine, waiting for the landing that never came in the Pas de Calais. Meanwhile, the usual stream of do-or-die orders issued forth from Fuehrer headquarters. These seem to have impressed the ordinary soldiers, who fought with their customary skill and tenacity, more than the generals. By the end of June both Rommel and von Rundstedt were convinced the battle was already lost and wanted to fall back toward the Seine; Hitler responded with a dose of his usual medicine; he relieved von Rundstedt and replaced him with Field Marshal Kluge, who, if he had less skill than von Rundstedt, had more faith in Hitler.
In early June the U. S. 1st Army, under General Omar Bradley, launched its main drive south from Carentan toward St.-Lô. Still trapped in the hedgerows, the infantry and armor made slow progress, leading to disparaging comments from the newspapers on the way the fighting was proceeding. St.-Lô did not fall until the 8th, after it had cost the Americans 11,000 casualties, and instead of achieving his major breakthrough, Bradley was forced