Spycraft - Melton [184]
As the Soviet forgery offensive continued through the early 1970s, the QDL was regularly called on to debunk professionally constructed documents appearing in the Middle East, South America, Africa, and even Europe. In one instance, the Soviets surfaced an Airgram (a form of telegram) aimed at destabilizing NATO. Dated December 3, 1974, the document outlined instructions for bribing foreign officials and engaging in espionage against friendly countries. The forgery was unmasked by the signature of a nonexistent official, Robert Pont, and several format mistakes, such as the use of slash marks in place of parentheses.47
The KGB was a longtime supporter of organizations with public-appeal names, such as the U.S. Peace Council, and cultivated members of the U.S. press.48 They trained forgery departments in Eastern Bloc intelligence services for the specific task of targeting the West. In the mid-1970s, the Soviets refocused their “active measures” campaign to capitalize on the Watergate scandal, Congressional hearings into alleged CIA abuses, and the Vietnam War aftermath after perceiving a receptive world audience for propaganda that described U.S. policy “mistakes” and “abuses of power.” 49
In one particularly ugly case, a counterfeit document surfaced during the Carter administration intended to stir worldwide controversy. A small San Francisco newspaper called the Sun-Reporter published a 1980 forgery of a Presidential Review Memorandum on Africa. The headline the paper ran could not have been clearer: “Carter’s Secret Plan to Keep Black Africans and Black Americans at Odds.” As the White House issued angry denials, the Soviet news agency, TASS, made the story available in a variety of languages.50
This was not the first time the Soviets had “played the race card” in a disinformation campaign. In 1971, forged pamphlets supposedly from the Jewish Defense League were mailed to radical African-American groups. Yuri Andropov, then head of the KGB, approved the bogus pamphlets that called for a Jewish campaign against “black mongrels.” Then, in 1984, the Soviets forged Ku Klux Klan material timed to coincide with the Olympic Games in Los Angeles. The taunting material, distributed to African and Asian countries, read, in part: “The Olympic Games For Whites Only! African Monkeys! A Grand reception awaits you in Los Angeles! We are preparing for the Olympic games by shooting at black moving targets . . .”51
Often believed by members of the press as well as heads of state, the Soviets’ propaganda could not be ignored by U.S. diplomats and intelligence. However, even when programs such as QDL conclusively proved a document a forgery, it was only after the fact. When the documents were verified false and, in the rare instances, a retraction printed, the initial damage had already been done, making disinformation a particularly effective weapon in developing countries. The intensity of these campaigns continued nearly unabated throughout the Cold War, prompting hearings in 1961, 1980, and 1982.
So significant was the threat to U.S. policy and the need to combat disinformation that in September 1979, DCI Stansfield Turner asked Crown to brief President Carter on the extent of the Soviet efforts and the CIA’s capability to detect and defeat the campaigns. Turner and Crown met in the historic Old Executive Office Building, then walked through an underground passage to the White House.
In the Oval Office were President Jimmy Carter and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Using samples of forgeries to describe the OTS methodology for identification and debunking, Crown’s presentation lasted several minutes beyond the allotted time. Fascinated by the Soviet offensive, Carter and his adviser recognized a powerful weapon that could strain diplomatic relations, generate headlines, and possibly determine elections both at home and abroad.
At a January 1984 conference of senior officers, the KGB’s First Chief Directorate reaffirmed a priority to “work unweariedly [sic] at exposing