Spycraft - Melton [187]
Sudanese President Jaafar Numeiri gradually shifted away from his Soviet Bloc orientation in 1969 and 1970, prompting an unsuccessful leftist coup in 1971. Hamdallah, one of the coup supporters, was in London at the time, but decided to return to Sudan in an attempt to reestablish an anti-Numeri organization.60 Arrested en route, he was returned to Sudan in custody, tried, and shot.
After Hamdallah’s death, details of his secret life were revealed. The Sudanese minister had cooperated at various times with East German as well as U.S. intelligence services.61 Markus Wolf, former head of East Germany’s foreign intelligence arm, described Hamdallah as an “intimate contact” with whom he had “developed a close personal as well as professional friendship.” 62
With Numeri still in power and Hamdallah replaced, Moore arranged for Crown to brief Ziada Satti, a senior Sudanese police official, on the scope of Soviet and indigenous forgeries circulating in the region. Satti listened attentively and recommended Moore and Crown take their information to the new Interior Minister. The Minister expressed particular interest in examination techniques, and quizzed Crown on U.S. prison construction before introducing the team to Brigadier General Rashid al-Din, head of the Sudanese National Security Agency. Al-Din was likewise receptive to the presentation, even mentioning the East Germans by saying, “You won’t see them around here anymore.” 63 Then, unexpectedly, al-Din brought up a name from Crown’s past. “Major Hamdallah had been a patriot, although now a dead one.”
A month later, the climb up Sudan’s diplomatic ladder continued with the CIA’s senior document examiner meeting President Numeiri himself. Crown recited his well-practiced litany of the many Soviet-originated forgeries bouncing around Africa. Numeiri was attentive and raised the subject of the 1969 find and the .22 caliber pen gun. Crown retold the story and his conclusions that the cache likely originated with the Soviets or East Germans.
Still suspicious about the CIA and its possible connection to the failed 1971 coup, the African leader probed Crown for information about his background and professional credentials.64 Crown responded that as a midlevel Pentagon forensic examiner, he cooperated with the Department of State and other U.S. government agencies when asked to do so.
Numeiri soon moved on to alleged Chinese support for Anyanya forces opposing his government, showing him photos and posters to analyze, then requested training for Sudanese examiners. The diplomat, Moore, quickly injected himself into the discussion, commenting that the U.S. government had “many ways” it could help and he would be pleased to work out the details.
As they left the president, Moore observed, “Dave, we make a great vaudeville team.”
Crown replied, “Yes, and we played the Palace.”
Both noted the irony in the fact that three years earlier a likely East German forgery intended to discredit the United States with the Sudanese had become the key to unlocking the door of normalized diplomatic relationships between the two countries.
An invitation to return to Khartoum arrived on Crown’s desk in March 1972. Satti, who had been promoted to Director General of Sudan’s Ministry of Interior and President Numeiri, were asking for another briefing. Crown reviewed his findings on the Chinese photographs, which were likely the work of Soviet propaganda. Numeiri expressed annoyance at policies of the Soviet Bloc, Libya, and Egypt intended to influence the Sudan. The U.S.-Sudanese relationship warmed with Numeiri’s changed policy, and career Foreign Service Officer Cleo Noel became the U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan. George Moore remained at his post in Khartoum, serving with Ambassador Noel until March of 1973 when both were taken hostage during a reception held at the Saudi Arabian Embassy and executed the