Spycraft - Melton [283]
20 The history of the Penkovsky case is detailed by Schecter and Deriabin in The Spy Who Saved the World.
21 Because one never knew what products might appear in the market from day to day, Soviet women carried an empty bag thinking “perhaps” scarce items would be available.
22 One Moscow chief would not allow officers to use surveillance receivers during their first months in-country. He wanted the officer’s observation and detection skills tested and proven lest the technology become a substitute for awareness and intuitive judgment.
23 During Operation GOLD (Berlin, 1955-56) the KGB had protected their underground communications lines by placing them inside airtight cables that had been pressurized with nitrogen gas. Any penetration of the cable would lower the pressure and alert the KGB communication technicians. To overcome this KGB safeguard, the CIA constructed a “tapping chamber” around an underground section of the cable that was pressurized before the cable was opened and the taps placed on the lines. Because the pressure inside the “tapping chamber” was the same as that inside the cable, the alarm did not sound.
24 H. Keith Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment: Spy Devices of the Cold War (New York: Sterling Publishing, 1993), 37. A standard 35mm camera loaded with Kodak high-speed-infrared 2481 film and utilizing a flash unit fitted with an infrared filter over the lens (Kodak Wratten gelatin filters nos. 87, 87C, 88A, or 89B) allowed photographs to be taken in complete darkness without betraying the use of the flash.
25 The remote interrogation allowed the CIA to transmit a signal to a transceiver built into CKTAW. It would then automatically reply with a signal indicating the operational status of the unit. The “tamper indicated” signal was sent if the CKTAW device had been tampered with, or compromised. If the CIA officer received this signal (or no signal) after the device was “interrogated,” the operation would be aborted.
26 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 29.
27 Ibid., 30.
28 During an interview with coauthor Keith Melton in 1997 in Moscow, Vitaly Yurchenko stated that his formal rank was that of a naval Commander, not Colonel.
29 Ronald Kessler, Escape from the CIA: How the CIA Won and Lost the Most Important KGB Spy Ever to Defect to the U.S. (New York: Pocket Books, 1991), 45.
30 Ibid., 47.
31 David Wise, The Spy Who Got Away: The Inside Story of Edward Lee Howard, the CIA Agent Who Betrayed His Country’s Secrets and Escaped to Moscow (New York: Random House, 1988), 19.
32 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 83-84.
33 Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, 40.
34 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 83-85.
35 Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, 59.
36 Ibid., 59-60.
37 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 86.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, 137.
41 Ibid., 138-139.
42 Kessler, Escape from the CIA, 184.
43 Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, 186-187.
44 Ibid.,188.
45 Ibid., 113.
46 Ibid., 192.
47 Though polygraph examinations are not admissible in court, the FBI uses them routinely as an investigation tool and a way for a suspect to “prove his innocence.” Howard, however, had a history of failing polygraph examinations and never considered submitting to the testing.
48 Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, 62.
49 Ibid., 199.
50 Ibid., 204.
51 Ibid., 204-205.
52 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 115.
53 Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, 213.
54 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 83-85.
55 Ibid., 84.
56 The CIA later learned that Howard had met Soviet intelligence officers during the fall of 1984 and again during the Spring of 1985. See: www.nacic.gov/pubs/misc/screen_backgrounds/spy_bios/edward_howard_bio.html.
57 In May 1985, Aldrich H. Ames, a CIA counterintelligence officer, began spying for the USSR and also revealed the CKTAW