Spycraft - Melton [68]
The TOO processed the film from casing runs and these street-level pictures were mated with Headquarters-supplied overhead photography. The distances, angles, and interfering structures between the potential base stations and an agent’s send positions were then plotted. As usable sites were identified, a site sketch map was prepared and passed to the agent via dead drop with instructions, “Here are the places to go to make your transmission during the next time period.”
From the vantage point of the twenty-first century, BUSTER is a primitive technology. However, compared to technical spy gear available to Penkovsky, it was a miracle advance. Not only did it link the agent and case officer more closely in real time than ever before possible, it also provided anonymity and security for the agent. Within little more than a decade after Penkovsky’s arrest, covert communications advanced from a matchbox dangling behind a radiator to electronic messaging that was virtually impossible to detect.6
BUSTER was not only created for Polyakov, but also benefited from his suggestions regarding its design and functionality. “In my opinion, Polyakov drove the technology,” said one of his case officers. “He would kind of teasingly say, ‘You mean to tell me the best you can do is give me something this big?’ Sometimes I think he would do it for the fun of it, his way of letting the case officer know they had more of an equal relationship than agent- handler. Not everyone gets to be a general in the GRU, and he knew he was very good at his job. Plus he had succeeded in working for us for years while leading a double life.”
Polyakov’s input proved invaluable, despite his teasing remarks. He understood the Soviet counterintelligence capabilities at home and abroad, as well as the consequences he faced should the device or its use be discovered. When he finally received the finished version of BUSTER, he told his case officer, “Tell your technical people this is great, I love this piece of equipment . . .” In 1980, Polyakov retired to pursue his passions for fishing, hunting, and woodworking. The story should have ended there, with a man of conscience quietly living out his remaining years.
The KGB eventually discovered Polyakov’s clandestine activities, but as with TRIGON, the discovery did not come from any known deficiencies in technical equipment or tradecraft. Both were betrayed by Americans working for Soviet intelligence.7 Two Americans compromised TOPHAT’s identity. The first, FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen exposed Polyakov to the GRU in 1979 while serving as a counterintelligence officer stationed in New York. The revelation strained credibility within the GRU and was thought to be almost unbelievable.8 By then Polyakov was a respected senior officer and even the somewhat timid proposal to launch a full investigation was turned down.9 Within the ranks of Soviet military intelligence, casting the shadow of suspicion on a Lieutenant General was to gamble one’s own career if the charge proved false, and few within the GRU were prepared to take that risk.
But in May 1985, CIA officer Aldrich Ames provided information to the KGB that implicated General Polyakov as a CIA asset. As part of its ensuing investigation, the KGB lured Polyakov away from his modest dacha outside Moscow, then arrested, interrogated, and executed him in 1986.10
Reliable accounts relate that during his interrogation he revealed details of what he handed over to his American contacts, and that he had refused the opportunity for exfiltration. In 1990, Pravda announced Polyakov’s execution in a story detailing the account of a Soviet citizen who spied for the Americans, named