Spycraft - Melton [76]
Even with reinforced seams, stronger materials, and less air pressure for rapid inflation, the problems persisted. The inflatable mannequins continued to sag in the wrong places, resulting in a less than lifelike appearance. The sagging was corrected by installing a valve to provide continuous slow inflation, but the valve had a tendency to hiss. Quality control by manufacturers was another problem. All mannequins did not equally tolerate rapid inflation.
Once the figure was inflated and in place, the techs had to devise an equally rapid deflation and efficient storage process for the device that would allow the case officer to reenter the car and take his place in the passenger seat as quickly as he had exited.
It was then that the research veered to the “elegant solution.” Was it necessary to create the most lifelike mannequin possible? KGB surveillance teams typically followed from behind or in front. Rarely did they pull alongside a car. Perhaps a three-dimensional representation was not required. Maybe all that was needed was a two-dimensional figure of the torso with a three-dimensional head. An alternative wooden, metal, and plastic mechanical pop-up prototype was constructed, eliminating inflatable dolls, air pumps, and difficult-to-explain trips to 14th Street.
This new piece of tradecraft acquired the nickname “Jack-in-the-Box,” or JIB. The final product could be concealed in a medium-sized briefcase placed on the passenger seat. No installation was required. With one hand a driver unlatched the briefcase and the JIB popped instantly into place. When the passenger was set to reenter the car, the JIB could be pushed back into its resting position with one hand and the “briefcase” shoved to the floor.
In May 1982, personal meetings with Tolkachev were temporarily suspended when increased KGB surveillance forced CIA officers to abort several planned meetings. Eventually, using the JIB, an officer was able to reestablish direct contact. Tolkachev had remained active, using his fake building pass to evade security restrictions, and his home photo sessions continued.
Unexpectedly, another set of restrictions had been imposed at the institute involving a new style of propusk, so the fake building pass that had just begun to work was now worthless. Compounding the problem were other regulations that limited all but a few senior officers from leaving the institute without written permission except during lunch. Increasingly Tolkachev’s only opportunity to photograph documents would be inside the institute.
CIA assessed the new security regulations as an indication that the KGB suspected the loss of information from the institute and attempts were under way to limit those losses until the leak could be identified. Tolkachev was urged to “stand down,” but the persistent agent would not stop his spying.
Tolkachev next provided a photograph of the new building pass and a color strip from the cover to assist OTS in creating a duplicate. He reported smuggling his 35mm camera into the institute on three occasions to photograph documents at his desk and turned over a dozen rolls of film in March 1983 and another dozen in April. As a result, upgraded miniature document cameras were given to Tolkachev for use inside the institute, along with directions to stop taking documents home.
New apprehension about Tolkachev’s security arose in April, after he passed information about a new Soviet fighter aircraft target recognition system. The institute’s security department requested a list of all personnel with access to that specific information. Tolkachev, convinced that the leak could be traced back to him, destroyed all his spy gear and other potentially incriminating possessions. His SRAC device, Pentax camera, charred remains of documents were all tossed out of his car along a stretch of road during the drive back from his country dacha.28
Throughout the autumn of 1983, five attempted personal meetings were cancelled because of KGB surveillance or Tolkachev