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Stephen Colbert and Philosophy - Aaron Allen Schiller [60]

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aimed at political authority or majority sentiment. French philosopher, sociologist, and social critic Michel Foucault (1926-1984) claims that

The function of parrhesia is not to demonstrate the truth to someone else, but has the function of criticism: criticism of the interlocutor or the speaker himself. ‘This is what you do and this is what you think; but this is what you should not do or should not think’. (Fearless Speech, p. 17)

Such criticism is frequently associated with democracy and challenge to political authority. However, there’s more to parrhesia than simply pointing out deficiencies of the status quo. Parrhesiastic criticism challenges majority opinion, but is also dialogical and risky. It requires dialogue with or about political authority. In particular, the social role of a parrhesiastes requires engaging in a “game” where one positions oneself with respect to others in an argumentative space. While this space is primarily conceived as oppositional, not all critiques of authority are instances of “fearless speech.”

Bumper stickers that criticize the president may be a kind of critique, but they are not necessarily parrhesiastic. This is because the function of a bumper sticker is to state one’s position without entering into dialogue with others. Our modern concept of “free speech” is thus wider than that of parrhesia, but the latter, contextual, kind of dialogic speech is more suited to promote democratic values. Anyone can slap bumper stickers on their car affirming their own beliefs, but parrhesia requires individuals to engage in a certain kind of relationship between themselves and the objects of their critique.

In addition to this dialogical engagement with authority, parrhesia emphasizes the risks involved in speaking freely. In his discussion of the “riskiness” of this kind of speaking, Foucault focuses on how such criticism of authority can lead to marginalization and even execution. In modern democracies this risk in speaking freely is rarely as explicit as the threat against Socrates during his trial and execution in ancient Athens. However, it’s simply wrong to say that it’s never risky to speak freely in modern democracies. Obvious and recent examples from America’s political history include controversial figures like Martin Luther King, Robert Kennedy, and former U.S. Surgeon General Joycelyn Elders.

Parrhesiastic speech is risky by its very nature, not simply because of the historical circumstances surrounding the speaker. These risks may come in a variety of forms. In the context of American political dialogue, for instance, individuals take a special kind of risk when criticizing political orthodoxy publicly. They take the risk of having their fundamental views challenged, and perhaps openly defeated, by others. Genuine dialogue thus requires being open to challenge and possibly to being convinced that one is wrong. This arises naturally out of the parrhesiastic idea that people engaging in discussion are talking to one another rather than at one another. In doing so, there’s always the risk of discovering that the opposing view is more convincing. It’s the fact that one takes this risk that makes democratic dialogue valuable, for without it even individuals who are speaking the truth are either shouting into the void or being shouted down.

Speaking from the Gut


The final aspect of “fearless speech” concerns the relationship of the truth-speaker to moral duty. Foucault uses the example of a criminal forced to confess as an example of someone who does not speak parrhesiastically, even though he is speaking the truth in admitting his crime. By contrast, parrhesiastic speech arises from the obligations of moral conscience. The conception of freedom embodied by practices of parrhesia is more than the freedom to do what one wants. Instead, it is the power to act for reasons that one knows are right. For some, the concept of “duty” calls up images of authoritarian obligation, not images of freedom. However, the possibility of democratic discussion depends on individuals

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