Stephen Colbert and Philosophy - Aaron Allen Schiller [86]
Another analogy Wittgenstein gives for language is the example of the controls on a train. Some levers push and pull, others turn, and some aren’t connected with anything at all. As we speak and interact with one another, we are constantly learning new words, finding new ways to use some expressions, and likewise, we leave some colloquial expressions behind.
Humor is part of language, and it too, constantly changes. Think of the different styles of comedy and the comedians who have come and gone. Think of the comedy your grandparents laugh at compared with what you laugh at. Sometimes the humor carries over from generation to generation, but most often it does not. Wittgenstein remarks, “what we call ‘wit’ and ‘humor’ doubtless did not exist in other ages. And both are constantly changing.” Part of this change is context, but also, the ‘taste’ of humor, this changes as well. We’ll return to these ideas of context and taste in humor later.
One of Wittgenstein’s contributions to the philosophy of language is his idea of a language game; “the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life.”145 When we communicate with one another, we participate in a language game. Like any game, we need to follow established rules, and like some games, there’s an element of improvisation. Among the many language-games that we engage in is making a joke, telling it, and play-acting. Stephen Colbert is often funny because of the way he twists and mixes language games. When we react, laugh, and discuss what we see with one another, we too are engaging in a language game; often we’re engaged in more than one game at a time, depending on the situation and circumstances.
Just as there are many tools that we use in a tool box, there are endless variations on how we use language. When we engage in humor, either because we laugh spontaneously at something naturally or we laugh due to something that was fabricated for our amusement, we are participating in language games. The rules for these language games, the tools we use are constantly evolving, are constantly changing. Thus we need a robust theory of humor that allows for the fluidity and flexibility of the language games we call humor.
A Robust, Rotund, and Rofound Philosophy of Humor
As I define it, humor is an aspect change. An aspect change is the thinking of something different when perceiving—the focus could be an object, a situation or an activity. Another name for this is ‘aspect-dawning’. Wittgenstein uses this term for ‘picture-objects’, objects that can be seen under more than one aspect. We could be looking at a face, a face we’ve seen a hundred times before, and then suddenly we see something new. The face hasn’t changed; it’s either our seeing or our interpreting that has changed. One time I stared at Uncle Larry’s nose until I saw in him Abraham Lincoln. We laugh because we see the world—and then we see it differently. The change of aspect happens to the one who thinks it. For a robust theory though, we will need more than just this concept: we also need a humorous attitude, a shared form of life, an avowal, a good pair of rubber gloves, and a 10 foot pole just for good measure. First, however, we need a discussion on aspect change.
Wittgenstein was interested in aspect change as an answer to a paradox left by the psychologist Joseph Jastrow,