Team of Rivals_ The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln - Doris Kearns Goodwin [145]
Secluding himself at home, Bates never developed a clear understanding of the varied constituencies that had to be aligned, a deficit that resulted in a number of missteps. While his distance from the fierce arguments of the fifties was considered beneficial to his candidacy, his long absence from politics made him less familiar with the savage polarization created by the slavery issue. In late February 1859, he answered the request of the Whig Committee of New York for his “views and opinions on the politics of the country.” The New York Whigs had passed a resolution calling for an end to agitation of “the Negro question” so that the country might focus on “topics of general importance,” such as economic development and internal improvements, that would unite rather than fracture the nation. In his letter, which was published nationwide, Bates declared that he had always considered “the Negro question” to be “a pestilent question, the agitation of which has never done good to any party, section or class, and never can do good, unless it be accounted good to stir up the angry passions of men, and exasperate the unreasoning jealousy of sections.” He believed that those who continued to press the issue, “after the sorrowful experience of the last few years,” must be motivated by “personal ambition or sectional prejudice.”
Lauded by Whigs and nativists, the letter provoked widespread criticism in Republican circles. Schuyler Colfax, who backed Bates for president, warned him that his comments “denouncing the agitation of the negro question” sounded like “a denunciation of the Rep[ublica]n party, and would turn many against [him].” Bates disagreed. “If my letter had been universally acceptable to the Republicans, that fact alone might have destroyed my prospects in two frontier slave states, Md. and Mo., and so I would have no streng[t]h at all but the Republican party,” where Seward and Chase, he knew, were far better positioned. Maryland congressman Henry Winter Davis, the leading member of the American Party in the House, confirmed Bates’s views, advising him that he was poised to secure majority approval and should not attempt to further define his views—“write no more public letters—let well enough alone.”
As the new year opened, Bates believed his chances were growing “brighter every day.” Supporters in the key battleground states of Indiana and Pennsylvania assured him that large percentages of the delegates appointed to the Chicago convention were “made up of ‘Bates men.’” A visitor from Illinois told him that much “good feeling” existed in the southern part of the state, “but first (on a point of State pride,) they must support Lincoln.” This was the first time in his daily entries that Bates so much as mentioned Lincoln’s name as a presidential aspirant. In Illinois, Lincoln was keenly aware of Bates, answering an inquiring letter about how Illinois regarded the various candidates by saying that Bates “would be the best man for the South of our State, and the worst for the North of it,” while Seward was “the very best candidate we could have for the North of Illinois, and the very worst for the South of it.” With amusing self-serving logic, Lincoln suggested that neither Bates nor Seward could command a majority vote in Illinois.
On the last day of February 1860, the very day of Seward’s conciliatory speech in the Senate, a great Opposition Convention comprised of Whigs and Americans met in Jefferson City, Missouri, and “enthusiastically” endorsed Bates for president. Two weeks later, Bates received a second endorsement from the Republican state convention in St. Louis. The Missouri Republicans, however, were in a carping mood, particularly