Team of Rivals_ The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln - Doris Kearns Goodwin [223]
Still ignorant of the mix-up, Welles wrote to Samuel Mercer, the current commander of the Powhatan, on April 5, instructing him to “leave New York with the Powhatan in time to be off Charleston bar” by the morning of the 11th. If the supply boats were permitted to land at Fort Sumter, he should return to New York at once. If their entry was opposed, then the Powhatan and its support ships should be used “to open the way.” Should the “peaceable” supply mission fail, “a reinforcement of the garrison” should be attempted by “disposing of your force,” as needed. The orders from Welles to Mercer were read to the president that same day and authorized.
The next day, Lincoln drafted a letter for Cameron to send through a messenger to the governor of South Carolina: “I am directed by the President of the United States to notify you to expect an attempt will be made, to supply Fort-Sumpter with provisions only; and that, if such attempt be not resisted, no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, will be made without further notice.” Lincoln had devised a means to separate the peaceful supply mission from the more controversial issue of reinforcement, forging, at least for the record, a final alternative to war.
While Lincoln’s strategy was creative, its execution was fatally bungled. Learning that the Pickens expedition was “embarrassed by conflicting orders from the Secretary of the Navy,” Captain Meigs had telegraphed Seward for an explanation. Placed in an awkward situation, Seward knew he would have to reveal the secret Pickens mission to Welles. Sometime after 11 p.m., Seward and Fred took a short walk to the Willard to talk with Welles. Earlier that evening, Welles, assuming that the Powhatan and its accompanying ships had already set sail for Sumter, had congratulated himself on accomplishing so much in such a short time.
Seward showed Welles the telegram, explaining that it must relate to the Powhatan, which was now under command of David Porter and on its way to Pensacola. Welles insisted that was impossible. The Powhatan was “the flagship” of the mission to Sumter. They decided to consult the president at once. Though midnight was approaching, Lincoln was still awake. Upon hearing the problem, he “looked first at one and then the other, and declared there was some mistake.” Once the error was clear, he told Seward to send Porter a telegram, ordering him to “return the Powhatan to Mercer without delay,” so that the Sumter expedition could proceed. Seward tried to champion the Pickens expedition, but Lincoln “was imperative,” insisting that the telegram go out that night.
To the astonishment of Welles, Lincoln “took upon himself the whole blame—said it was carelessness, heedlessness on his part—he ought to have been more careful and attentive.” In fact, Welles continued, Lincoln “often declared that he, and not his Cabinet, was in fault for errors imputed to them.” Seward reluctantly sent the telegram; but Porter had already set sail for Florida. A fast ship was dispatched to catch up with the Powhatan, but when Porter read the telegram, bearing Seward’s signature instead of the president’s, he continued to Florida, on the assumption that the previous order signed by the president had priority.
When Gustavus Fox reached Charleston, he spent hours futilely searching for the Powhatan, having no clue the vessel had been misrouted. Nor did he know that Confederate authorities in Montgomery had intercepted his plans and ordered the commander in Charleston, Brigadier General Pierre Beauregard, to attack the fort before the Powhatan and Union convoy were due to arrive. At 3:30 a.m. on April 12, Beauregard sent a note to Anderson announcing his intent to commence firing in one hour. Anderson’s small