The American Plague - Molly Caldwell Crosby [70]
During that meeting, it was decided that Lazear would focus more heavily on the mosquito theory, building on the work he had already compiled over the previous months. Since the first outbreak of fever in May, Lazear had been making notations about yellow fever—the symptoms of patients, where the fever broke out and where it turned up next, weather observations and careful study of the mosquitoes local to the area. Lazear still believed that if malaria could be spread by mosquitoes, it was possible that yellow fever could as well. Carroll and Agramonte would continue their autopsies and tissue samples in search of something in the body—whether microbe or otherwise—that appears in yellow fever patients.
The lab work would be helpful, but most likely inconclusive; Reed knew that the next step would have to be human experiments. In a letter to Sternberg, Reed wrote, “Personally, I feel that only can experimentation on human beings serve to clear the field for further effective work.” He never indicates in letters or otherwise whether he believes the mosquito theory will be proven or disproved by such action, only that “with one or two points cleared up, we could then work to so much better advantage.” Reed took his idea of human experiments to the board, and they agreed that should they be willing to experiment on human beings, they should be prepared to experiment on themselves as well. How could they ask for the self-sacrifice of others without submitting to the same studies?
Agramonte’s departure from the board that August would not be the only one noted. According to James Carroll, Walter Reed left without explanation the morning after the board decided to self-experiment and sailed for the United States. Carroll overtly implied that Reed did so to avoid infecting himself. It became a stain on the board’s work and indirectly accused Reed of cowardice. In truth, whether or not Reed planned to infect himself, he had been plotting his return to the United States weeks before this meeting took place. In letters to Emilie, as well as Sternberg, Reed wrote about plans to catch the Rawlins whenever it came into port. What’s more, travel to and from Cuba was unreliable at best. Transports could be days late, and baggage was subject to a lengthy disinfecting process before the steamer could set sail. In letters to Emilie, Reed tried to sound reassuring: “The Quartermaster told me this afternoon that the Rawlins would be here Tuesday afternoon,& would leave either Wednesday evening or Thursday morning—So that the chances of getting away August 1 or 2nd are very good.” In other words, it would be nearly impossible to jump aboard a ship the morning after the board met and flee.
Carroll went so far as to suggest that Reed fabricated a reason to leave Cuba as well, having a carte blanche to sail to and from Cuba whenever he liked. When Reed and Carroll arrived in Cuba that June to work with the Yellow Fever Board, they learned that Dr. Shakespeare, Reed’s partner in the typhoid study, had died suddenly from a heart attack. That left only Dr. Victor Vaughan to finish all of the work. Reed wrote on several occasions about plans to return to help Vaughan finish the report, and under some pressure from the surgeon general to present the typhoid paper, Reed undoubtedly felt a priority to that study. After all, yellow fever had been well contained at Quemados, and with the sickly season coming to a close, even autopsies were few and far between. The fact that Carroll would make such a slanderous suggestion about his friend and colleague seems to further illuminate his emotional deterioration during the time he served on the board. For Carroll, the work would soon prove to be physically harrowing as well, bringing him to the brink of death and back again.
The steamer Rawlins was scheduled to reach the Havana harbor