The Army of the Cumberland [24]
could be brought forward to take their place. Heth wished to attack, but Kirby Smith would not permit this, as he anticipated a battle with Buell, and that Bragg would have to fight his entire army, in which event he would need every available man. Heth fell back in a few days and on October 4th Smith reported with his command to Bragg at Frankfort.
Bragg's movements became clearly apparent to Buell while the latter was concentrating at Murfreesboro. On September 7th, Buell started with Ammen's, Crittenden's, McCook's, Wood's, Rousseau's, and Mitchell's divisions in the race between the opposing armies for Louisville. If Bragg moved energetically and with the intent of taking Louisville without fighting a battle in Kentucky before he reached that city, his start in the race and the shorter line he was moving on gave him the decided advantage in the movement. Buell's object was to overtake Bragg, and, if necessary, force the fighting. This would compel the latter to move his army so closely on the one road open to him that his movements would be necessarily slow. Failing in this, Buell's plans were to press Bragg so hard that if he refused to fight in Kentucky he must leave the State in possession of the Federal forces before he could gain anything by his advance.
Buell, after reaching Nashville, crossed the river there at once and pushed on with all possible speed. He left Thomas's, Palmer's, and Negley's divisions, with Thomas in command, as the garrison at this place. So important did Buell regard the holding of Nashville, that he determined to weaken his immediate command and leave this strong force under his most trusted subordinate, to retain possession of that point. He considered his army in pursuit of Bragg of sufficient strength to make the fight for the possession of Kentucky, and in the event Bragg was driven from that State he would concentrate in the vicinity of Nashville, where the battle for that important position with Middle Tennessee would yet have to be fought. In the happening of the latter event it was an absolute necessity that the Federal army should hold Nashville as a point at which to concentrate and move to the attack. If the result of the movement in Kentucky should be the defeat of Buell, then it was important that the general in command of the forces at Nashville should be an officer of experience, to save the troops left there, in their retreat to rejoin the main army. Buell regarded the holding of Nashville by our forces as second only to the safety of Kentucky, and made the disposition of his command accordingly. With this view, on the 12th, he ordered R. B. Mitchell's division to return to Nashville and form part of the garrison of that place. Bragg, on the 8th, had reached the railroad, where he burned the bridge at Salt River, and for some days in his northward march was engaged in tearing up the railroad as he advanced. On the 13th, his cavalry reached Munfordville beyond Green River.
Buell, on the 10th, learning that additional forces of Bragg's command were crossing the Cumberland at Gainesville, at once countermanded the order to Mitchell, and directed Thomas to place Negley in command of Nashville, and if he regarded it best to do so, to leave Paine's division [Palmer in command] with Negley's to hold that place. If Paine could be spared, then Thomas was to move forward by forced marches with his division and Paine's, and unite his command with the main army. Thomas, knowing that Bragg had left a large force to threaten Nashville, ordered Paine's division to remain there, and started at once with the first division to report to Buell.
Bragg, to reach Munfordville, had only sixty-eight miles to march from his crossing of the Cumberland River, while Buell had one hundred and five miles to travel before he could intercept him at that place. Bragg's advance had reached and attacked Munfordville before Buell's army had arrived at Bowling Green. On Bragg's advance under General Chalmers, arriving at Munfordville, his cavalry engaged the attention of the garrison
Bragg's movements became clearly apparent to Buell while the latter was concentrating at Murfreesboro. On September 7th, Buell started with Ammen's, Crittenden's, McCook's, Wood's, Rousseau's, and Mitchell's divisions in the race between the opposing armies for Louisville. If Bragg moved energetically and with the intent of taking Louisville without fighting a battle in Kentucky before he reached that city, his start in the race and the shorter line he was moving on gave him the decided advantage in the movement. Buell's object was to overtake Bragg, and, if necessary, force the fighting. This would compel the latter to move his army so closely on the one road open to him that his movements would be necessarily slow. Failing in this, Buell's plans were to press Bragg so hard that if he refused to fight in Kentucky he must leave the State in possession of the Federal forces before he could gain anything by his advance.
Buell, after reaching Nashville, crossed the river there at once and pushed on with all possible speed. He left Thomas's, Palmer's, and Negley's divisions, with Thomas in command, as the garrison at this place. So important did Buell regard the holding of Nashville, that he determined to weaken his immediate command and leave this strong force under his most trusted subordinate, to retain possession of that point. He considered his army in pursuit of Bragg of sufficient strength to make the fight for the possession of Kentucky, and in the event Bragg was driven from that State he would concentrate in the vicinity of Nashville, where the battle for that important position with Middle Tennessee would yet have to be fought. In the happening of the latter event it was an absolute necessity that the Federal army should hold Nashville as a point at which to concentrate and move to the attack. If the result of the movement in Kentucky should be the defeat of Buell, then it was important that the general in command of the forces at Nashville should be an officer of experience, to save the troops left there, in their retreat to rejoin the main army. Buell regarded the holding of Nashville by our forces as second only to the safety of Kentucky, and made the disposition of his command accordingly. With this view, on the 12th, he ordered R. B. Mitchell's division to return to Nashville and form part of the garrison of that place. Bragg, on the 8th, had reached the railroad, where he burned the bridge at Salt River, and for some days in his northward march was engaged in tearing up the railroad as he advanced. On the 13th, his cavalry reached Munfordville beyond Green River.
Buell, on the 10th, learning that additional forces of Bragg's command were crossing the Cumberland at Gainesville, at once countermanded the order to Mitchell, and directed Thomas to place Negley in command of Nashville, and if he regarded it best to do so, to leave Paine's division [Palmer in command] with Negley's to hold that place. If Paine could be spared, then Thomas was to move forward by forced marches with his division and Paine's, and unite his command with the main army. Thomas, knowing that Bragg had left a large force to threaten Nashville, ordered Paine's division to remain there, and started at once with the first division to report to Buell.
Bragg, to reach Munfordville, had only sixty-eight miles to march from his crossing of the Cumberland River, while Buell had one hundred and five miles to travel before he could intercept him at that place. Bragg's advance had reached and attacked Munfordville before Buell's army had arrived at Bowling Green. On Bragg's advance under General Chalmers, arriving at Munfordville, his cavalry engaged the attention of the garrison