The Army of the Cumberland [45]
Into this gap Cleburne immediately threw his division, and advanced, filling the interval in the front line between McCown and Polk. This gave Hardee double the length of front originally contemplated, and made it a single line instead of a double with division front. These two divisions thus formed then struck McCook's right flank--Johnson's division. McCook's line was very weak and poorly posted. It was thin and light, without reserves, with neither the troops nor commanding officers in their places, as they should have been, under Rosecrans's orders of the evening before.
Every soldier on that field knew when the sun went down on the 30th that on the following day he would be engaged in a struggle unto death, and the air was full of tokens that one of the most desperate of battles was to be fought. In the face of all this, Johnson, the commander of the First Division on the right, was not on the line nor near enough to his troops to give orders to them, his headquarters being a mile and a half in the rear. General Willich the commander of the Second Brigade, which had been posted for the express purpose of protecting the extreme right of our army, was absent from his command at division headquarters. His brigade was not even in line, as they had been ordered to get their breakfast. The batteries of the division were not properly posted, and in some cases the horses were away from the guns to the rear for water. All this was criminal negligence--a failure in the performance of duty--for which some one should have suffered. To the faulty position of the line and to the unprepared condition of the troops is to be attributed the almost overwhelming disaster that overtook our army on that day. As the two divisions of the enemy advanced, Kirk threw forward the Forty-fourth Illinois to support the skirmish line, and called on Willich's brigade for help. This brigade being without an immediate commander, no effort was made to support Kirk. The contest was too unequal to be maintained for any great length of time, and Johnson's division, after a sharp and spirited but fruitless contest, crumbling to pieces, was driven back with a loss of eleven guns. Kirk was mortally wounded and Willich was captured, returning to his command as it was driven back. Kirk's brigade lost 473 killed and wounded, and had 342 captured. Willich's brigade had a few less killed and wounded, but more than twice that number captured.
Baldwin in reserve near headquarters was too far from the front to aid in supporting either of the other brigades of Johnson's division. Stragglers from Kirk's and Willich's brigades gave the first information to Baldwin of the disaster on the right. Hastily forming his troops, he had barely time to post them in line of battle before the enemy in immense masses appeared on his front at short range, their left extending far beyond the extreme right of his line. Opening at once a destructive fire upon their dense masses with his infantry and artillery, Baldwin succeeded in checking their advance in his front, but their left continued to swing around on his right. Here four pieces of Simonson's battery posted near the woods in the rear of the first position opened with terrible effect. The enemy came on in such overwhelming numbers, that after half an hour's stubborn resistance Baldwin was compelled to retire, not however until the enemy had flanked his right and were pouring in an enfilading fire. As it was he barely made his escape, since in a moment longer his entire command would have been surrounded and captured. At the edge of the woods Baldwin endeavored to make another stand, but before he could form his line he was again forced back. Retiring slowly, with several halts in the cedars, Baldwin with his brigade reached the railroad where the rest of the division was being reformed.
The right flank being driven from its position by the left of the enemy, Davis's division then felt the full force of the victorious sweep of the rebel troops, flushed with success and aided by the forces immediately
Every soldier on that field knew when the sun went down on the 30th that on the following day he would be engaged in a struggle unto death, and the air was full of tokens that one of the most desperate of battles was to be fought. In the face of all this, Johnson, the commander of the First Division on the right, was not on the line nor near enough to his troops to give orders to them, his headquarters being a mile and a half in the rear. General Willich the commander of the Second Brigade, which had been posted for the express purpose of protecting the extreme right of our army, was absent from his command at division headquarters. His brigade was not even in line, as they had been ordered to get their breakfast. The batteries of the division were not properly posted, and in some cases the horses were away from the guns to the rear for water. All this was criminal negligence--a failure in the performance of duty--for which some one should have suffered. To the faulty position of the line and to the unprepared condition of the troops is to be attributed the almost overwhelming disaster that overtook our army on that day. As the two divisions of the enemy advanced, Kirk threw forward the Forty-fourth Illinois to support the skirmish line, and called on Willich's brigade for help. This brigade being without an immediate commander, no effort was made to support Kirk. The contest was too unequal to be maintained for any great length of time, and Johnson's division, after a sharp and spirited but fruitless contest, crumbling to pieces, was driven back with a loss of eleven guns. Kirk was mortally wounded and Willich was captured, returning to his command as it was driven back. Kirk's brigade lost 473 killed and wounded, and had 342 captured. Willich's brigade had a few less killed and wounded, but more than twice that number captured.
Baldwin in reserve near headquarters was too far from the front to aid in supporting either of the other brigades of Johnson's division. Stragglers from Kirk's and Willich's brigades gave the first information to Baldwin of the disaster on the right. Hastily forming his troops, he had barely time to post them in line of battle before the enemy in immense masses appeared on his front at short range, their left extending far beyond the extreme right of his line. Opening at once a destructive fire upon their dense masses with his infantry and artillery, Baldwin succeeded in checking their advance in his front, but their left continued to swing around on his right. Here four pieces of Simonson's battery posted near the woods in the rear of the first position opened with terrible effect. The enemy came on in such overwhelming numbers, that after half an hour's stubborn resistance Baldwin was compelled to retire, not however until the enemy had flanked his right and were pouring in an enfilading fire. As it was he barely made his escape, since in a moment longer his entire command would have been surrounded and captured. At the edge of the woods Baldwin endeavored to make another stand, but before he could form his line he was again forced back. Retiring slowly, with several halts in the cedars, Baldwin with his brigade reached the railroad where the rest of the division was being reformed.
The right flank being driven from its position by the left of the enemy, Davis's division then felt the full force of the victorious sweep of the rebel troops, flushed with success and aided by the forces immediately