The Army of the Cumberland [57]
of battle.
Rosecrans in his report repeatedly speaks of "the faulty line of McCook's formation on the right." But he knew this on the 30th, and told McCook that it was improperly placed. McCook did not think so. Rosecrans told him that it faced too much to the east and not enough to the south, that it was too weak and long, and was liable to be flanked. Knowing all this and knowing McCook's pride of opinion, for McCook told him he "did not see how he could make a better line," or a "better disposition of my troops," it was the plain duty of Rosecrans to reform the line, to conform to what it should be in his judgment. The order to McCook to build camp fires for a mile beyond his right was another factor that brought about the combination that broke the line on the right. Rosecrans was correct in his conception of this, in order to mislead Bragg and cause him to strengthen his left at the expense of his right. Had Bragg awaited Rosecrans's attack, this building of fires was correct--if it took troops away from the right to reinforce the left; but this it did not do. Bragg moved McCown and Cleburne's divisions from his right to his left on Tuesday, but after this Bragg brought none of his forces across the river until Wednesday afternoon. The building of the fires caused Bragg to prolong his lines, lengthening them to the extent that before Hardee struck Kirk's and Willich's brigades, he thought our line extended a division front to their right. Finding this not to be the case, he whirled his left with all the force of double numbers on to the right of McCook. The rebels then swinging around found themselves in the rear of Johnson's division before they struck any troops on their front. Of course it is mere guess-work to say just what the outcome might have been of any other formation of the line, but it is safe to say that had the left instead of the centre of Hardee struck the right of McCook, there would have been a better chance for the troops on the extreme right of his line to have shown the spirit that was in them, before they were overpowered by mere superiority of numbers.
Then there were some minor mistakes that aided in a great degree the bringing about of that mishap which imperiled the safety of the entire army. Even granting that Johnson was not in any way responsible for the position occupied by his troops on the front line of battle, still it is hard to find any excuse or even explanation for a general officer in command of a division who, knowing the enemy were in force on his front, and intending to attack his command at daylight the next morning, would place his headquarters a mile and a half in the rear. This too, when he knew that the post of honor and responsibility for the safety of the entire army had been committed to his keeping. What then shall be said for him when it appears by the report of the commanding officer of his reserve brigade that when it returned from the support of a cavalry reconnoissance, the general commanding the division ordered this brigade, on the eve of the battle, to take position in the woods, "near the headquarters of the division," instead of in supporting distance of the front line? He could not have thought that the division headquarters needed the support of the reserve more than the line of battle. It is safe to say that had the line of Johnson's division been properly formed, so as to give the most strength to the command--short and well centered, with a good brigade like that of Baldwin's in reserve, with all officers in their places--these troops would have given a very different account of themselves when the blow struck the right. There was no commanding officer in the front with Johnson's division, of greater command than a regiment--save General Kirk. The troops of Willich's brigade on the right flank refused to come to his assistance, because there was no one there to give them orders. Johnson says in his official report that "In consultation with Major-General McCook, late in the afternoon of December 30th, he informed me that he had
Rosecrans in his report repeatedly speaks of "the faulty line of McCook's formation on the right." But he knew this on the 30th, and told McCook that it was improperly placed. McCook did not think so. Rosecrans told him that it faced too much to the east and not enough to the south, that it was too weak and long, and was liable to be flanked. Knowing all this and knowing McCook's pride of opinion, for McCook told him he "did not see how he could make a better line," or a "better disposition of my troops," it was the plain duty of Rosecrans to reform the line, to conform to what it should be in his judgment. The order to McCook to build camp fires for a mile beyond his right was another factor that brought about the combination that broke the line on the right. Rosecrans was correct in his conception of this, in order to mislead Bragg and cause him to strengthen his left at the expense of his right. Had Bragg awaited Rosecrans's attack, this building of fires was correct--if it took troops away from the right to reinforce the left; but this it did not do. Bragg moved McCown and Cleburne's divisions from his right to his left on Tuesday, but after this Bragg brought none of his forces across the river until Wednesday afternoon. The building of the fires caused Bragg to prolong his lines, lengthening them to the extent that before Hardee struck Kirk's and Willich's brigades, he thought our line extended a division front to their right. Finding this not to be the case, he whirled his left with all the force of double numbers on to the right of McCook. The rebels then swinging around found themselves in the rear of Johnson's division before they struck any troops on their front. Of course it is mere guess-work to say just what the outcome might have been of any other formation of the line, but it is safe to say that had the left instead of the centre of Hardee struck the right of McCook, there would have been a better chance for the troops on the extreme right of his line to have shown the spirit that was in them, before they were overpowered by mere superiority of numbers.
Then there were some minor mistakes that aided in a great degree the bringing about of that mishap which imperiled the safety of the entire army. Even granting that Johnson was not in any way responsible for the position occupied by his troops on the front line of battle, still it is hard to find any excuse or even explanation for a general officer in command of a division who, knowing the enemy were in force on his front, and intending to attack his command at daylight the next morning, would place his headquarters a mile and a half in the rear. This too, when he knew that the post of honor and responsibility for the safety of the entire army had been committed to his keeping. What then shall be said for him when it appears by the report of the commanding officer of his reserve brigade that when it returned from the support of a cavalry reconnoissance, the general commanding the division ordered this brigade, on the eve of the battle, to take position in the woods, "near the headquarters of the division," instead of in supporting distance of the front line? He could not have thought that the division headquarters needed the support of the reserve more than the line of battle. It is safe to say that had the line of Johnson's division been properly formed, so as to give the most strength to the command--short and well centered, with a good brigade like that of Baldwin's in reserve, with all officers in their places--these troops would have given a very different account of themselves when the blow struck the right. There was no commanding officer in the front with Johnson's division, of greater command than a regiment--save General Kirk. The troops of Willich's brigade on the right flank refused to come to his assistance, because there was no one there to give them orders. Johnson says in his official report that "In consultation with Major-General McCook, late in the afternoon of December 30th, he informed me that he had