The Believing Brain - Michael Shermer [41]
Figure 5. Patternicity and Belief
Psychologist Susan Blackmore discovered that believers in ESP and other forms of the paranormal were more likely to see an object in the maximally degraded image in the upper left corner than were skeptics of the paranormal, but the believers made more identification mistakes. ILLUSTRATIONS COURTESY OF SUSAN BLACKMORE.
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An even more direct link between patternicity and perceived levels of control over the environment was demonstrated in a 2008 study descriptively titled “Lacking Control Increases Illusory Pattern Perception,” by management researchers Jennifer Whitson at the University of Texas–Austin and Adam Galinsky from Northwestern University, who studied how psychological states are affected by corporate environments. Defining an “illusory pattern perception” (a form of patternicity) as “the identification of a coherent and meaningful interrelationship among a set of random or unrelated stimuli (such as the tendency to perceive false correlations, see imaginary figures, form superstitious rituals, and embrace conspiracy beliefs, among others),” the researchers conducted six experiments to test the thesis that “when individuals are unable to gain a sense of control objectively, they will try to gain it perceptually.”30 Why do people do this? “Because,” Whitson explained to me as she tried to gain a sense of control in a quiet corner of a busy airport jetting between conferences, “feelings of control are essential for our well-being—we think clearer and make better decisions when we feel we are in control. Lacking control is highly aversive, and one fundamental way we can bolster our sense of control is to understand what’s going on. So we instinctively seek out patterns to regain control—even if those patterns are illusory.”
Whitson and Galinsky sat subjects before a computer screen, telling one group they must guess which of two images embodied an underlying concept the computer had selected. For example, they might see a capital A and a lowercase t, colored, underlined, or surrounded by a circle or square. Subjects would then guess at an underlying concept, such as all capital As are red. There was no actual underlying concept—the computer was programmed to randomly tell the subjects they were either “correct” or “incorrect.” Consequently, they developed a sense of lacking control. Another group did not receive randomized feedback and so felt more in control. In the second part of the experiment subjects were shown twenty-four “snowy” photographs, half of which contained hidden images such as a hand, horses, a chair, or the planet Saturn, whereas the other half just consisted of grainy random dots. (See figure 6 for an example of Saturn dots versus random dots.) Although nearly every subject correctly identified the hidden figures, subjects in the lack-of-control group found more patterns in the photographs that had no embedded images compared to subjects in the baseline group.
In a second experiment, Whitson and Galinsky had subjects vividly recall an experience in which they either had full control or lacked control over a situation. The subjects then read stories in which outcomes of situations for the characters were preceded by unconnected and superstitious behaviors (such as foot stomping before entering a meeting) that led to success (such as having one’s idea approved in the meeting). The subjects were then asked whether they thought the characters’ behavior was related to the outcome. Those who had recalled an experience in which they lacked control perceived a significantly greater