The Black Banners_ 9_11 and the War Against Al-Qaeda - Ali H. Soufan [225]
Like Fallon, NCIS chief psychologist Mike Gelles objected to what the military interrogators were doing, and together they went to see NCIS director David Brant. He agreed with them and they spoke to Alberto J. Mora, the navy’s general counsel. Mora told them: “I don’t understand how they can be doing these things. You guys are the ones with the interrogation experience. I suggest you go back to Gitmo and try talking to General Miller.”
Fallon and Gelles flew to Gitmo to see General Miller and again explained their objections. Based on their experience dealing with terrorists, they told him, these techniques didn’t get results. Furthermore, they were illegal under U.S. law. Miller dismissed them: “You have got to put on the same jersey if you want to be on the team.”
“Listen, General,” Fallon replied, “we don’t work for you. We’ve got a separate chain of command. We’re not going to participate and will continue to oppose these techniques.”
When Mora learned of the conversation, he contacted Jim Haynes a few times to object to the use of the techniques. At one point, the Senate report states, he told Haynes that he thought the techniques authorized by Rumsfeld “could rise to the level of torture.” Haynes ignored Mora’s warnings.
Having failed to get Haynes or his superiors in the Pentagon to listen, on January 15, 2003, Mora drafted a memo saying that the techniques were clearly illegal and sent it to Haynes, warning him that he’d sign the memo by the end of the day unless the use of the techniques ended. A senior administration lawyer calling what the administration was doing “illegal” would cause serious problems; Rumsfeld, later that day, signed an order rescinding his approval of the techniques.
Mora’s victory was short-lived, however. In March 2003, Rumsfeld secretly reauthorized twenty-four techniques, at which point Mora had left the navy for private practice.
The Pentagon, at the time of this back-and-forth, declared that Qahtani’s questioning was “worthwhile,” and a spokesman from the Defense Department said that he was “a valuable source of information.” Unnamed Bush administration officials told reporters that his interrogation provided information about planned attacks and the financial networks used by terrorists.
Later, when the techniques were no longer being used, I was asked to go back to interrogate Qahtani because basic information was still missing. Despite claims of success, not only did those employing the harsh techniques not get any valuable information, they hadn’t even managed to get the basic stuff.
I spoke to Qahtani and he gave me details we wanted about his training and his interactions with KSM and other plotters, among other information. He told me about his difficulties in learning English phrases and using e-mail, and KSM’s frustrations, and told me that when Mustafa al-Hawsawi was training him, he would go to the beach at sunset to pray.
“What did you pray about?” I asked.
“I asked God to give me a sign showing whether he agreed with my mission. I told him if he agreed with my mission then he should facilitate my trip. If he didn’t, then he should stop it.”
Contrary to Bush administration claims about Qahtani’s importance, nothing gained from Qahtani while he was subjected to the coercive techniques could have saved a single life. The 9/11 Commission concluded