The Black Banners_ 9_11 and the War Against Al-Qaeda - Ali H. Soufan [255]
Bin Laden’s death followed the so-called Arab Spring of 2011, during which citizens of countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, Jordan, Algeria, and Syria challenged their rulers. I was in the Middle East during that period, and one of the most striking things about the protests was the absence of al-Qaeda rhetoric among the demonstrators.
Al-Qaeda differs from many other Islamic extremist groups in that its leaders urge people to focus on the United States (the far enemy) rather than the rulers of their own countries (the near enemy). Bin Laden had been very successful in convincing other groups to ally with al-Qaeda and focus on the United States—claiming that was the best way to topple the regimes they opposed. But the Arab Spring showed that, contrary to al-Qaeda’s narrative, hated rulers can be toppled peacefully without engaging the United States. In fact, people saw the United States even supporting their efforts, further ruining al-Qaeda’s claims. It also became apparent that those rulers used the threat of al-Qaeda to justify to other nations their oppressive reigns and to settle scores with other countries and opponents.
This solidified a drift away from al-Qaeda that had been occurring during the previous few years among former supporters in the Muslim world. Those people had grown increasingly sick of al-Qaeda’s merciless killings and terrorist attacks—the majority of al-Qaeda’s victims are Muslims—and had come to realize that the group doesn’t have any political program or long-term ideas; it only kills.
Bin Laden’s death was another blow to al-Qaeda. Not only was he the leader, but he embodied its members’ belief that their version of Islam was correct, that terrorism was the right weapon, and that they would ultimately be victorious—as they believed the black banners hadith predicted. It was his personal appeal that was central to al-Qaeda’s recruitment and fund-raising. With a bullet from a SEAL’s gun, al-Qaeda suffered a mortal blow, losing its greatest asset.
On June 16, 2011, al-Qaeda–General Command announced that bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, would take charge of the group. (Saif al-Adel had been the interim leader after bin Laden’s death.) Zawahiri, however, brings with him a host of problems for the group: he is seen as a divisive figure who lacks bin Laden’s appeal and charisma, so he won’t be able to pull in recruits and funds or keep everyone in line, as bin Laden did. The fact that he’s an Egyptian will also count against him, given the rivalry between al-Qaeda’s Egyptian and Gulf Arab members.
While bin Laden’s death and Zawahiri’s promotion weakened al-Qaeda, neither event killed the group. Some of al-Qaeda’s leadership council members are still at large.They command their own followers and are trying to launch operations to prove al-Qaeda’s continuing relevance. And with al-Qaeda on the decline, regional groups that had aligned themselves with it may return to operating independently. This in many ways makes them deadlier—as they’re harder to monitor and have a wider scope of operations. That the Zawahiri announcement came from al Qaeda–General Command rather than just from al-Qaeda hints that such divisions may already be emerging.
To ever fully defeat al-Qaeda, or the subsequent new groups that emerge, we need to realize that military operations, interrogations, and intelligence successes are only half the battle. The other half is in the arena of ideas—countering the narratives and recruitment methods that extremists use. We can keep killing and arresting terrorists, but if new ones keep joining, our war will never end.
As the Saudi king demonstrated with the “devil’s box,” and as Sun Tzu taught in The Art of War, understanding your opponents, and using that knowledge to undermine