The Coming Conquest of England [97]
of Europe again seemed paralysed for a long time by internal disruption. But our triumph was short-lived! No one had suspected that Prussia would prove so strong. Then the first defects in our policy became apparent. After the first German victories on the Rhine, England ought to have concluded an alliance with France and declared war against Prussia. Great political revolutions require considerable time, and a clever government should always look ahead. Bismarck slowly prepared England's defeat. Thirty years ago we had a presentiment of this; it threatened us like a storm- cloud, but our Government had not the courage to look things in the face and lacked the energy." A general, who had hitherto said nothing, took up the conversation. He belonged to the engineers, and was on his way to take over the command of Gibraltar. "We talk about the loss of India," said he; "but who knows whether we have not to fear an invasion of England herself?" "Impossible!" exclaimed all the gentlemen present; "England will never allow her men-of-war to be driven out of the Channel." "I hope so too, but I don't know whether you gentlemen remember how close the danger of Napoleon landing an army on English soil once was." "And if it had made its appearance, it would have been smashed to pieces by British fists!" cried Mr. Kennedy. "Perhaps. But why have we never consented to the Channel Tunnel being made? All military authorities, especially Wolseley, are absolutely opposed to opening a road so convenient for traffic and trade. They have always declared that England must remain an island, only accessible by sea. This is certainly the first and most essential condition of England's power." "Well, then," said Mr. Kennedy, "as England is still an island, and we have always adhered to the principle of keeping a fleet superior to that of the two strongest naval powers, where is the danger?" "Danger? There is always a danger, when one has enemies," replied the General. "I maintain that at the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was a toss up whether Napoleon crossed or not; and I don't believe that we should have been a match for our great opponent, if he had once got a firm footing on our coast." "His plan was a visionary one and therefore impracticable." "His plan only failed because it was too complicated. If he had had modern telegraphic communication at his disposal, this would not have been the case. He could have directed the operations of his fleet by cable. If Admiral Villeneuve had sailed to Brest (instead of Cadiz) as he was ordered and joined Admiral Gantaume, he would have had fifty-six ships of the line to cover Napoleon's passage from Boulogne to the English coast. No, gentlemen, you must not think England's strategical position unassailable. I am as confident of the superiority of our naval forces as you are, but in these days of steam and electricity England is no longer as safe as she was when the movement of ships depended on the wind and orders had to be given by mounted messengers and signals." "So you really think, General, that Napoleon's plan would have been practicable?" "Most certainly. Napoleon had no luck in this enterprise. In the first place, his greatest misfortune was the death of Admiral Latouche-Treville. If he had been in Villeneuve's place, he would most likely have proved a competent commander. He was the only French naval officer who could have opposed Nelson. But he died too soon for France, and his successor, Villeneuve, was his inferior in ability. But there are other special circumstances, more favourable to a landing in England than in Napoleon's day. For instance--to say nothing of cable and steam--the fact that modern transports can carry an enormously larger number of troops. Napoleon had to fit out 2,293 vessels to transport his army of 150,000 men and to protect the transports, had 1,204 gunboats and 135 other armed vessels at his disposal, in addition to the transports proper. As nearly all his ships were constructed to land men, horses, and guns on the level beach without