The Devil's Casino_ Friendship, Betrayal - Vicky Ward [5]
from Huntington, Long Island, until fights over compensation drove them apart.
Joe Gregory persuaded Tucker and Lessing to go to Fuld and essentially ask for Pettit's
resignation in March 1996. Fuld knew that with Tucker, Lessing, and Gregory behind
him, he finally controlled the firm; he demoted Pettit to head of client relations. The
episode is still called the Ides of March by senior Lehman executives because the
demotion occurred on March 15, the day Julius Caesar was killed by his former friends in
44 B.C.
Six months later, Pettit resigned. Three months after that, he was dead.
With Pettit gone, Fuld was able to tighten his grip on the firm. He took elocution lessons,
and evolved into the leader he had never before been. Lehman's stock soared over the
next ten years as it evolved into an investment bank. The stock price rose to $86, and
Fuld was the hottest CEO in town, featured in a 2006 issue of Fortune magazine as the
man who had transformed the "notoriously fractious" firm into a "super-hot machine."
The chief banger of the drums, the man urging the firm to take more risk, was the man
who had orchestrated the ousting of Pettit--and had replaced him: Joe Gregory, the
second Lehman President.
But inside Lehman's headquarters at 745 Seventh Avenue, people worried that dangerous
corners were being cut in Fuld's haste to beat what he perceived as the enemy: Goldman
Sachs. On June 9, 2008, Lehman reported its second-quarter loss of $2.8 billion, the
company's first quarterly loss since going public in 1994. The stock fell 9 percent that
day. Yet for months, Erin Callan, the new CFO and a Gregory "pet," had been telling the
market that Lehman had plenty of capital--that the company was in good shape.
On June 12, Lehman announced that Joe Gregory was out. When he left, he took Callan
down with him, but the damage they had done was irreversible. Disaster loomed.
For a while Dick Fuld could not see where he had gone wrong. As he later testified
before Congress about the fall of Lehman, "I wake up every single night thinking, 'What
could I have done differently? What could I have said? What should I have done? ' And I
have searched myself every single night. And I come back to this: At the time I made
those decisions, I made those decisions with the information that I had. I can look right at
you and say, this is a pain that will stay with me for the rest of my life. . . ."
This was before he learned that Gregory, who had cashed several hundred million out of
Lehman, asked for a further $233 million from the Lehman estate after the company had
been declared bankrupt plus, according to filings, another employee benefit plan for
$700,000 per year for 25 years at the firm and a further $2.4 million per year for 15 years.
Fuld, who had asked for nothing when the end came, was reportedly horrified. He, like a
handful of others, had deluded himself into thinking that Gregory was a good guy;
Gregory was the guy who told young Lehman managing directors he didn't want to hire
people "who regularly checked their bank balances." Yet Gregory was, in the words of
his former friend and carpooler, Steve Lessing, "a phony."
So, no, this is not yet one more book about the crash of 2008. Rather it is a parable about
the foibles of men, the corrosive influence of money, and the dangers of hubris.
"One firm" was the Lehman Brothers mantra, and most people thought Fuld had dreamed
up the slogan. But he hadn't.
That was the handiwork of Lew Glucksman, who used to stand in his office by the
trading floor and snap a single pencil in front of his employees. He would then hold a
group of pencils together and say, "Watch: When they are together, I can't break them."
The man who embodied that slogan best was not Fuld. It was Chris Pettit, who once, in a
sly tribute to Glucksman and the camaraderie Pettit had instilled at Lehman Brothers,
handed out pencils with all the senior executives' names on them as party favors. He was
the man who once staked