The Elements of Law Natural and Politic [35]
act. For it is impossible for a man to transfer that right which he himself hath not; and that right he hath not, which he himself hath before transferred. 15. An OATH is a clause annexed to a promise, containing a renunciation of God's mercy, by him that promiseth, in case he perform not as far as is lawful and possible for him to do. And this appeareth by the words which make the essence of the oath (viz.) so help me God. So also was it amongst the heathen. And the form of the Romans was, Thou Jupiter kill him that breaketh, as I kill this beast. The intention therefore of an oath being to provoke vengeance upon the breakers of covenants; it is to no purpose to swear by men, be they never so great, because their punishment by divers accidents may be avoided, whether they will, or no; but God's punishment not. Though it were a custom of many nations, to swear by the life of their princes; yet those princes being ambitious of divine honour, give sufficient testimony, that they believed, nothing ought to be sworn by, but the Deity. 16. And seeing men cannot be afraid of the power they believe not, and an oath is to no purpose, without fear of him they swear by; it is necessary that he that sweareth, do it in that form which himself admitteth in his own religion, and not in that form which he useth, that putteth him to the oath. For though all men may know by nature, that there is an Almighty power, nevertheless they believe not, that they swear by him, in any other form or name, than what their own (which they think the true) religion teacheth them. 17. And by the definition of an oath, it appeareth that it addeth not a greater obligation to perform the covenant sworn, than the covenant carrieth in itself, but it putteth a man into a greater danger, and of greater punishment. 18. Covenants and oaths are de voluntariis, that is, de possibilibus. Nor can the covenantee understand the covenanter to promise impossibles; for they fall not under deliberation: and consequently (by chap. XIII, sect. 10, which maketh the covenantee interpreter), no covenant is understood to bind further, than to our best endeavour, either in performance of the thing promised, or in something equivalent.
Chapter 16
Some of the Laws of Nature
1. It is a common saying that nature maketh nothing in vain. And it is most certain, that as the truth of a conclusion, is no more but the truth of the premises that make it; so the force of the command, or law of nature, is no more than the force of the reasons inducing thereunto. Therefore the law of nature mentioned in the former chapter, sect. 2, namely, That every man should divest himself of the right, &c. were utterly vain, and of none effect, if this also were not a law of the same Nature, That every man is obliged to stand to, and perform, those covenants which he maketh. For what benefit is it to a man, that any thing be promised, or given unto him, if he that giveth, or promiseth, performeth not, or retaineth still the right of taking back what he hath given? 2. The breach or violation of covenant, is that which men call INJURY, consisting in some action or omission, which is therefore called UNJUST. For it is action or omission, without jus, or right; which was transferred or relinquished before. There is a great similitude between that we call injury, or injustice in the actions and conversations of men in the world, and that which is called absurd in the arguments and disputations of the Schools. For as he, that is driven to contradict an assertion by him before maintained, is said to be reduced to an absurdity; so he that through passion doth, or omitteth that which before by covenant he promised not to do, or not to omit, is said to commit injustice. And there is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so called; for he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the time to come; and he that doth any action, willeth it in that present, which is part of the future time, contained in the covenant: and therefore he that violateth a covenant, willeth the
Chapter 16
Some of the Laws of Nature
1. It is a common saying that nature maketh nothing in vain. And it is most certain, that as the truth of a conclusion, is no more but the truth of the premises that make it; so the force of the command, or law of nature, is no more than the force of the reasons inducing thereunto. Therefore the law of nature mentioned in the former chapter, sect. 2, namely, That every man should divest himself of the right, &c. were utterly vain, and of none effect, if this also were not a law of the same Nature, That every man is obliged to stand to, and perform, those covenants which he maketh. For what benefit is it to a man, that any thing be promised, or given unto him, if he that giveth, or promiseth, performeth not, or retaineth still the right of taking back what he hath given? 2. The breach or violation of covenant, is that which men call INJURY, consisting in some action or omission, which is therefore called UNJUST. For it is action or omission, without jus, or right; which was transferred or relinquished before. There is a great similitude between that we call injury, or injustice in the actions and conversations of men in the world, and that which is called absurd in the arguments and disputations of the Schools. For as he, that is driven to contradict an assertion by him before maintained, is said to be reduced to an absurdity; so he that through passion doth, or omitteth that which before by covenant he promised not to do, or not to omit, is said to commit injustice. And there is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so called; for he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the time to come; and he that doth any action, willeth it in that present, which is part of the future time, contained in the covenant: and therefore he that violateth a covenant, willeth the