The Eleventh Day_ The History and Legacy of 9_11 - Anthony Summers [306]
45 plans postponed: CR, 259, 534n28;
46 “will still happen”: ibid., 260, 534n32;
47 Miller/“very spun-up”: FBI IG;
48 slow progress/“But the Principals’ ”: Testimony of Richard Clarke, 4/8/04, CO;
49 Bush vacation/“I’m sure”: ABC News, 8/3/01, AP, 8/6/01, USA Today, 8/3/01;
50 Cheney: Jackson Hole News & Guide (Wyoming), 8/15/01;
51 poll/“too much”: USA Today, 8/6/01, “Public Critical of Bush’s Vacation Plans,” 8/7/01, www.gallup.com, WP, 8/7/01. As things turned out, the president was to return to Washington a few days earlier than planned, on August 30 (Public Papers of the Presidents, George W. Bush, 2001, www.gpoaccess.gov, 1569);
52 CBS re PDB/“bin Laden’s”: “What Bush Knew Before September 11,” 5/17/02, www.cbsnews.com;
53 Fleischer/“very generalized”: press briefing, 5/16/02, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.gov;
54 Fleischer follow-up: press briefing, 5/17/02, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.gov;
55 Rice/“not a warning”/“an analytic”/“hijacking”/“could have”: press briefing, 5/16/02, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov;
56 “historical”: ibid., Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO;
57 struggle: e.g. Report, JI, 1, Kean & Hamilton, 89–;
58 “the most highly”: press briefing by Ari Fleischer, 5/21/02, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.gov;
59 CIA refused: Report, JI, 1;
60 several released: Thomas Blanton, “The President’s Daily Brief,” National Security Archive, 4/12/04, www.gwu.edu;
61 leather binder: Tenet, 31;
62 “top-secret”: Graham, with Nussbaum, 80;
63 “news digest”: Blanton, “The President’s Daily Brief”;
64 truly secret/dull: ibid., Shenon, 220;
65 Joint Inquiry pressed: Report, JI, 1;
66 Commission/“What did”: Kean & Hamilton, 89–, Zelikow to Kean & Hamilton, Proposal for Breaking PDB Impasse, 9/25/03, “Letters & Memos, Negotiations over Access to PDBs,” B6, Dan Marcus files, CF;
67 “blowtorch”: Ben-Veniste, 239;
68 heading had not read: The Washington Post had reported the correct headline as early as May 19, 2002, two days after Fleischer misstated it. The significance of the press secretary’s omission of the word “in,” however, got lost in the fog of the subsequent White House effort to minimize the PDB’s overall importance (“Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer,” 5/17/02, www.gwu.edu, WP, 5/19/02, Nation, 4/12/04).
69 Aug. 6 PDB: released 4/10/04, “Withdrawal Notice re 4–12–04 memo re Aug. 6 PDB, Withdrawal Notice re 5–16–01 Daily UBL Threat,” B6, Dan Marcus files, CF. The PDB also referred to the fact that, as indicated by the attacks on the American embassies in Africa in 1998, bin Laden prepared operations “years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks.” The PDB also stated that the FBI was currently “conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the U.S.” that it considered bin Laden–related. This last assertion turned out to be a CIA misunderstanding of a liaison call to the FBI. Some seventy individuals were apparently being investigated by the FBI (Testimony of Thomas Pickard, 4/13/04, CO, Zegart, 109).
70 redacted: Fact Sheet on Aug. 6, 2001, PDB, Office of the Press Secretary, 4/10/04, www.gwu.gov;
71 “said nothing”/at own request: remarks by the President to the Travel Pool [Fort Hood, TX], 4/11/04, www.whitehouse.gov;
72 Bush/Commission meeting/Ben-Veniste account: Ben-Veniste, 293– & see Shenon, 291–, 340–, CR, 260–, Kean & Hamilton, 206–;
73 Clarke “in writing”: see CR, 255, 263, 535n5;
74 “I really don’t”: Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO.
75 nobody could have foreseen: Rice acknowledged in her 2004 Commission testimony that she had misspoken in her comment to the press in 2002 that “no one” could have predicted hijackers using planes as missiles. Given the Genoa situation, she said—and given that others had indeed foreseen the possibility—Rice said she ought to have said only that