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The Eleventh Day_ The History and Legacy of 9_11 - Anthony Summers [318]

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19 “It is important”: ibid., CTC Watchlisting Guidance, cited at Report, JI, 1;

20 CIA did not alert State/FBI: Report, JI, 40–, 144–, Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05, FBI IG, Graham with Nussbaum, 7–, CR, 355;

21 “promised to let”: Staff Statement 2, CO;

22 “Michelle”/“to the FBI”: FBI IG, & see Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05;

23 “James”/“as soon as”/“in the event”: Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/20/02, JI, Report, JI, 81, FBI IG;

24 refused interview: FBI IG;

25 “Michelle” prevaricated: FBI IG;

26 Wilshire/“did not know”: ibid. In the transcript of a hearing before a U.S. Senate subcommittee, the former deputy chief’s name is rendered not as “Wilshire” but as “Wilshere.” The authors have used “Wilshire,” the spelling most commonly used. (“The Global Reach of al Qaeda,” Hearings, Subcommittee on International Operations & Terrorism, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., 12/18/01, 7–);

27 Wilshire deliberately/draft cable/Miller CIR/“pls hold”: FBI IG, & see Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05.

28 “Doug came”/“Is this a no go”: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 18–. In a detailed note for his book Disconnecting the Dots, due for publication in 2011, author Kevin Fenton would note that Rossini was to resign from the FBI in 2008 after breaching regulations. He had, according to an FBI press release, used Bureau computers to find out information for personal purposes. Fenton argues cogently, however, that the lapse does not detract from Rossini’s credibility on the matter of the blocked CIR. The fact of its blocking, and that the agent saw relevant cables in 2000, is well documented (Fenton, proof copy kindly shared with the authors, 2011, 44n26).

29 “unable to locate”: FBI IG;

30 Wilshire int. redacted: corr. Kristen Wilhelm, 2011.

31 Wilshire proposed: FBI IG. Wilshire’s actions in July 2001 were reportedly spurred by his review of the CIA cable and email traffic recording Mihdhar’s movements in January the previous year—including the information that Mihdhar had a valid U.S. multiple-entry visa. For reasons unknown, but perhaps because he feared discovery of the fact that he had been in the United States the previous year, Mihdhar had meanwhile obtained a new passport and a new visa in June 2001. He used this new visa when he reentered the United States on July 4. There is no evidence that Wilshire or anyone else at CIA was aware of the new passport and visa at the time the search for Mihdhar was renewed in July 2001 (Wilshire spurred: CR, 267–, FBI IG; new passport/visa: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 33–.)

32 Following a series: FBI IG, CR, 267–, & re discovered/search see Chs. 27, 28, & 29. Aside from the events described here, the CIA and the FBI disputed each other’s versions of events about the identification of Tawfiq bin Attash (referred to in the Commission Report as “Khallad”) in the Malaysia surveillance photos. The identification was made by a source the FBI and the CIA shared—a circumstance that led to a prolonged tussle between the agencies. This barely penetrable story is detailed in the Justice Department’s inspector general’s report. The bottom line is that FBI agents working the Cole investigation, who knew of Attash’s connection to that attack, would have been far more concerned—and pressed to know all the CIA knew about the Malaysia meeting—had they been told that Attash had been present. As it was, they would learn nothing of Attash’s link to Mihdhar and Hazmi until after 9/11. The CIA’s performance on this matter notwithstanding, it is evident that once the information on Mihdhar’s and Hazmi’s likely presence in the United States was passed to the Bureau in August 2001, the FBI fumbled badly. As described in Chapter 27 of this book, the agent at Bureau headquarters who processed the

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