The Eleventh Day_ The History and Legacy of 9_11 - Anthony Summers [331]
8 CIA Report 2003/“no credible”/pressure/“questions”: Report, “U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,” 314, 322, 353, 363, 449–.
9 Duelfer/senior intelligence officials: The detainee to whom Duelfer referred was Muhammed Khudayr al-Dulaymi, who had headed the M-14 section of the Mukhabarat, the principal Iraqi intelligence agency. Duelfer noted the episode in a 2009 book and in an interview. The story was reported by Robert Windrem, senior research fellow at New York University’s Center on Law and Security and a longtime producer for NBC (Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek, NY: PublicAffairs, 2009, 416, Robert Windrem, “Cheney’s Role Deepens,” 5/13/09, www.dailybeast.com).
10 “There were two”/“We were not”: McClatchy News, 4/21/09, Report, “Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services,” 110th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11/20/08, 72.
11 Suskind/forgery/brief storm/denials: Following Ronald Suskind’s account of the forgery’s origins in his 2008 book, The Way of the World, House Judiciary Committee chairman John Conyers wrote letters saying he intended to follow up. As this book went to print, however, there was no sign that he did. The Suskind book suggests that the forgery was handwritten by former Iraqi intelligence chief Tahir Habbush, who began cooperating with the CIA even before the Iraq invasion and was eventually paid off and “resettled.” The purported memo was slipped to a British reporter, billed as authentic, by an aide in the Interim Governing Council in Iraq, and published in late 2003 in Britain’s Sunday Telegraph (Ronald Suskind, The Way of the World, NY: Harper, 2008, 361–, CIA statement, 8/22/08, www.cia.gov, “Statement from Rob Richer,” http://suskinsresponse.googlepages.com, “A Note to Readers,” www.ronsuskind.com, Letters from Rep. Conyers to Rob Richer, John Maguire, A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard, & John Hannah, 8/20/08, www.judiciary.house.gov).
12 Giraldi: Philip Giraldi, “Suskind Revisited,” 8/7/08, www.amconmag.com;
13 “manufactured”: int. Paul Pillar for Frontline: “The Dark Side,” www.pbs.org;
14 “Unfortunately”/It’s my belief: press release, 6/5/08, http://intelligence.senate.gov, Report, cited above.
15 reputable estimates re deaths: www.iraqbodycount.org, http://icasualties.org. In addition to the American military casualties, more than three hundred non-U.S. troops had died as of early 2011 (Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, www.icasualties.org).
CHAPTER 35
1 “led and financed”: Richard Falkenrath, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” International Security, Vol. 29, Winter 04;
2 only three nations: CR, 122;
3 “Pakistani military”/“held the key”: CR, 63–.
4 financial transactions: Known 9/11-related money transfers were handled out of Dubai in the UAE. In anticipation of pursuit in the wake of the attacks, the al Qaeda agents involved headed for Pakistan.
5 Rawalpindi, headquarters: Fouda & Fielding, 181;
6 Defense Society: ibid., 15;
7 Zubaydah caught: ibid., 20, int. John Kiriakou;
8 “Pakistani people”: Scheuer, Osama bin Laden, 121;
9 “We found”: ed. Lawrence, 71;
10 “As for Pakistan”: Rashid, 138;
11 called on the faithful: Scheuer, Osama bin Laden, 121.
12 “the most complicated”: Sunday Times (U.K.), 8/1/10;
13 Kashmir: CR, 58, 63–, Coll, Ghost Wars, 292. China also controls part of Kashmir. The region is a tinderbox.
14 Hamid Gul: Rashid, 129;
15 trained in camps: CR, 67, Clinton, 799, Rashid, 137, Coll, Ghost Wars, 341;
16 “Whatever”: Scheuer, Osama bin Laden, 121;
17 security system: Coll, Ghost Wars, 341;
18 “shoehorned”: Time, 8/19/08;
19 “always” support: Foreign Policy Journal, 9/20/10;
20 “actually were”: MFR 03012967, 10/8/03;
21 additional cash: Coll, Ghost Wars, 296;
22 “the most influential