The Fathers of the Constitution [24]
debate with Hayne when he said: "We are accustomed to praise the lawgivers of antiquity; we help to perpetuate the fame of Solon and Lycurgus; but I doubt whether one single law of any lawgiver, ancient or modern, has produced effects of more distinct, marked and lasting character than the Ordinance of 1787." While improved means of communication and many other material ties have served to hold the States of the Union together, the political bond was supplied by the Ordinance of 1787, which inaugurated the American colonial system.
CHAPTER V. DARKNESS BEFORE DAWN John Fiske summed up the prevailing impression of the government of the Confederation in the title to his volume, "The Critical Period of American History." "The period of five years," says Fiske, "following the peace of 1783 was the most critical moment in all the history of the American people. The dangers from which we were saved in 1788 were even greater than were the dangers from which we were saved in 1865." Perhaps the plight of the Confederation was not so desperate as he would have us believe, but it was desperate enough. Two incidents occurring between the signing of the preliminary terms of peace and the definitive treaty reveal the danger in which the country stood. The main body of continental troops made up of militiamen and short-term volunteers--always prone to mutinous conduct--was collected at Newburg on the Hudson, watching the British in New York. Word might come at any day that the treaty had been signed, and the army did not wish to be disbanded until certain matters had been settled primarily the question of their pay. The officers had been promised half-pay for life, but nothing definite had been done toward carrying out the promise. The soldiers had no such hope to encourage them, and their pay was sadly in arrears. In December, 1782, the officers at Newburg drew up an address in behalf of themselves and their men and sent it to Congress. Therein they made the threat, thinly veiled, of taking matters into their own hands unless their grievances were redressed. There is reason to suppose that back of this movement--or at least in sympathy with it--were some of the strongest men in civil as in military life, who, while not fomenting insurrection, were willing to bring pressure to bear on Congress and the States. Congress was unable or unwilling to act, and in March, 1783, a second paper, this time anonymous, was circulated urging the men not to disband until the question of pay had been settled and recommending a meeting of officers on the following day. If Washington's influence was not counted upon, it was at least hoped that he would not interfere; but as soon as he learned of what had been done he issued general orders calling for a meeting of officers on a later day, thus superseding the irregular meeting that had been suggested. On the day appointed the Commander-in-Chief appeared and spoke with so much warmth and feeling that his "little address . . . drew tears from many of the officers." He inveighed against the unsigned paper and against the methods that were talked of, for they would mean the disgrace of the army, and he appealed to the patriotism of the officers, promising his best efforts in their behalf. The effect was so strong that, when Washington withdrew, resolutions were adopted unanimously expressing their loyalty and their faith in the justice of Congress and denouncing the anonymous circular. The general apprehension was not diminished by another incident in June. Some eighty troops of the Pennsylvania line in camp at Lancaster marched to Philadelphia and drew up before the State House, where Congress was sitting. Their purpose was to demand better treatment and the payment of what was owed to them. So far it was an orderly demonstration, although not in keeping with military regulations; in fact the men had broken away from camp under the lead of noncommissioned officers. But when they had been stimulated by drink the disorder became serious. The humiliating feature of the situation was that Congress could do nothing,
CHAPTER V. DARKNESS BEFORE DAWN John Fiske summed up the prevailing impression of the government of the Confederation in the title to his volume, "The Critical Period of American History." "The period of five years," says Fiske, "following the peace of 1783 was the most critical moment in all the history of the American people. The dangers from which we were saved in 1788 were even greater than were the dangers from which we were saved in 1865." Perhaps the plight of the Confederation was not so desperate as he would have us believe, but it was desperate enough. Two incidents occurring between the signing of the preliminary terms of peace and the definitive treaty reveal the danger in which the country stood. The main body of continental troops made up of militiamen and short-term volunteers--always prone to mutinous conduct--was collected at Newburg on the Hudson, watching the British in New York. Word might come at any day that the treaty had been signed, and the army did not wish to be disbanded until certain matters had been settled primarily the question of their pay. The officers had been promised half-pay for life, but nothing definite had been done toward carrying out the promise. The soldiers had no such hope to encourage them, and their pay was sadly in arrears. In December, 1782, the officers at Newburg drew up an address in behalf of themselves and their men and sent it to Congress. Therein they made the threat, thinly veiled, of taking matters into their own hands unless their grievances were redressed. There is reason to suppose that back of this movement--or at least in sympathy with it--were some of the strongest men in civil as in military life, who, while not fomenting insurrection, were willing to bring pressure to bear on Congress and the States. Congress was unable or unwilling to act, and in March, 1783, a second paper, this time anonymous, was circulated urging the men not to disband until the question of pay had been settled and recommending a meeting of officers on the following day. If Washington's influence was not counted upon, it was at least hoped that he would not interfere; but as soon as he learned of what had been done he issued general orders calling for a meeting of officers on a later day, thus superseding the irregular meeting that had been suggested. On the day appointed the Commander-in-Chief appeared and spoke with so much warmth and feeling that his "little address . . . drew tears from many of the officers." He inveighed against the unsigned paper and against the methods that were talked of, for they would mean the disgrace of the army, and he appealed to the patriotism of the officers, promising his best efforts in their behalf. The effect was so strong that, when Washington withdrew, resolutions were adopted unanimously expressing their loyalty and their faith in the justice of Congress and denouncing the anonymous circular. The general apprehension was not diminished by another incident in June. Some eighty troops of the Pennsylvania line in camp at Lancaster marched to Philadelphia and drew up before the State House, where Congress was sitting. Their purpose was to demand better treatment and the payment of what was owed to them. So far it was an orderly demonstration, although not in keeping with military regulations; in fact the men had broken away from camp under the lead of noncommissioned officers. But when they had been stimulated by drink the disorder became serious. The humiliating feature of the situation was that Congress could do nothing,