The Federalist Papers - Alexander Hamilton [10]
In The Federalist’s second part, the "spirit of moderation" comes to the fore and with it the freedom to deliberate on the various means or institutions actually proposed in the Constitution. Thus in contrast to the proud confidence in human knowledge displayed in the first part, the second volume begins by questioning, in No. 37, how and what we can know. Human reason needs to reflect on its own limitations if it would grow wise. In politics, this means recognizing not only that "theoretical propriety" must often be sacrificed to "extraneous considerations," but that "theoretical propriety" should not be expected in the first place (No. 37, pp. 221, 226). Prudence or practical wisdom is the god of this lower world, not mathematics. "Nothing can be more fallacious," Publius concludes in No. 55, "than to found our political calculations on arithmetical principles" (p. 339). Nor is human nature simply or mainly "ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious" (No. 6, p. 48). "As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust," Publius acknowledges, "so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form" (No. 55, p. 343). Instead of emphasizing the "natural course of things" (No. 8, p. 63) from whose deterministic sway America is not exempt, Publius points to nature as a standard for human choice—and a support for, though by no means a guarantee of, human excellence. His reappraisal of nature is perhaps most telling in his defense of judicial review, where he invokes "the nature and reason of the thing" as a criterion or determination of "truth and propriety," to which human laws and institutions ought to conform (No. 78, p. 467).
Publius’s defense of the Constitution culminates, then, in the description of high offices of government whose holders will need wisdom, temperance, respectability, courage, magnanimity, judgment, and other eminent qualities or qualifications in order to do their duty (No. 57, p. 348; No. 63, p. 382; No. 71, pp. 431, 433; No. 76, pp. 454–455). Earlier, in Federalist No. 10 (p. 75), Publius had warned that "enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm." But now he does his best to show that the very design of these offices—their powers, number, duration, and other constitutional characteristics—will help to attract "fit characters" to them, though the kind of character that is fitting will vary with the office. For instance, Publius affirms that the electoral college "affords a moral certainty that the office of President will seldom fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications." In fact, he speaks of "a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters preeminent for ability and virtue," or "at least respectable" (No. 68, p. 412; No. 71, p. 431; No. 76, p. 454).
The second volume of The Federalist is concerned overwhelmingly with the articulation of this structure of offices, beginning with a general account of the separation of powers in Nos. 47–51, followed by the treatment of each power or branch in turn. In Publius’s account, the "particular structure" of the government, based on separated powers, is combined with or inserted into its "general form," the republican