The Federalist Papers - Alexander Hamilton [20]
NO. 24: THE POWERS NECESSARY TO THE COMMON DEFENSE FURTHER CONSIDERED 153
Objection as to standing army answered—These powers given to Congress—Limitations on Congress—No interdiction in State constitutions, with two exceptions, to standing armies—None in articles of Confederation—Necessity of such powers in the federal government—Our commerce demands a navy.
NO. 25: THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 158
Objection that States can provide for common defense answered—The common defense cannot be entrusted to the separate States because it would be oppressive to some States, might become dangerous to all, would create jealousies between the States, and might imperil the authority of the Union—Provisions of the Confederation in this respect—A mistake to restrain the discretion of Congress in keeping or raising armies—Disadvantages of militia—Standing armies sometimes necessary when there is no foreign war—Example of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts—Dangerous to restrain too much the federal government.
NO. 26: THE IDEA OF RESTRAINING THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY IN REGARD TO THE COMMON DEFENSE CONSIDERED 163
Its origin—Not in favor here—The exclusion of military establishments in time of peace—Its origin and progress—Giving the authority to Congress a sufficient safeguard—Reasons for this—Objection that the Executive may seize supplies answered and an appeal made on this point for Union.
NO. 27: THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 170
The objection that the new government will require the military force to administer its laws considered—The national government not in danger of popular ill-will any more than those of the States—Reasons for believing that the federal government will be better administered than those of the States—Less liability to sedition against federal government—Less likely to require force than that proposed by the opposition—Reasons for this—The laws of the Union, so far as they go, to be the supreme law of the land.
NO. 28: THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 173
Cases in which the federal government must use force—Equally necessary in plan of opposition—Employment of force controlled by Congress—If Congress prove unfaithful there is the original right of self-defence—The States’ security against federal usurpation—Further security in the extent of territory and the limited resources of the country.
NO. 29: CONCERNING THE MILITIA 178
Regulation of militia must be confided to federal government to secure uniformity of organization and discipline—Objections that no power is given to federal magistrate to call out posse comitatus, that danger may be apprehended from authority over militia, answered—The project of "Publius" for a militia establishment and its advantages—The appointment of officers of militia by States a sufficient safeguard—Objection as to power to order militia to distant States answered.
NO. 30: CONCERNING THE GENERAL POWER OF TAXATION 183
Such power necessary to every constitution—Evil effects of want of such power—Results in present Confederation—Objection that Congress should be limited to external taxation answered—Evils and defects of the system of requisitions—Without general power existing funds would be diverted in time of war—The general power will bring out the resources of the country and give confidence to lenders.
NO. 31: THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 189
The importance of first principles—In morals and politics—Reasons for diversity of opinion on these matters—The positions thus far established reviewed. The opposing arguments as to usurpations by the federal government and as to federal aggressions on State governments reviewed—The popular sympathy with the State governments.
NO. 32: THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED 193
Objection that the general power of taxation would interfere with the State levies considered—Barrier against this danger—Federal sovereignty limited—The only exclusive power of taxation in the federal government is in laying duties on imports—The power of taxation in all other respects concurrent with that of the States—Proof of this—No repugnancy between federal