The Federalist Papers - Alexander Hamilton [8]
Nos. 37–40: The delicate work of the Convention and the "general form" of the proposed government(i.e., its republicanism and federalism)
Nos. 41–46: The "quantity" or "general mass of power" invested in the new government and whether this is dangerous to the States
Nos. 47–84: The "particular structure" of the government and the distribution" of its mass of power
Nos. 47–51: The separation of powers in general
Nos. 52–58: The House of Representatives
Nos. 59–61: The regulation of elections
Nos. 62–66: The Senate
Nos. 67–77: The Executive
Nos. 78–83: The Judiciary
No. 84: Miscellaneous objections, including the lack of a Bill of Rights
No. 85: Conclusion, including the Constitution’s "analogy to your own State constitution" and "The additional security which its adoption will afford to the preservation of that [republican] species of government, to liberty, and to property"
The two volumes or main divisions of The Federalist thus have different themes that dictate different points of view and kinds of argument. The theme of the first volume is the Union, meaning the necessity of maintaining a "firm" and "well-constructed" Union as opposed to allowing its dissolution into separate confederacies of states (e.g., a Southern Confederacy, Northern Confederacy, etc.). Publius announces "that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice." But reflective men know that politics cannot ignore the role of "accident and force" in human affairs, and the first volume of The Federalist is a long tutorial in the ways in which American republicans should anticipate the threats that will, inevitably, be posed by "accident and force." Publius concentrates his arguments, therefore, on the forceful necessities that require Union. "Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention," he observes in No. 3 (p. 36), "that of providing for their safety seems to be first." He amplifies the thought in No. 8 (pp. 61–62): "Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates." These are not "vague inferences," Publius notes, but "solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress of human affairs (p. 63)."
Indeed, "nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government" (No. 2, p. 31), which is made necessary precisely by the problem of safety or self-preservation. Throughout The Federalist’s first volume or first part, the Constitution seems to be for the sake of the Union, and the Union seems to be for the sake of safety or self-preservation. Nature is always close to necessity in these papers, and politics close to physics or mathematics in its calculus of the human passions. Publius describes representation, for example, as a "great mechanical power" by which the will of society may be concentrated and "its force directed to any object which the public good requires." The emphasis is on concentrating and projecting society’s will, not on refining or shaping it. The problem of politics seems to be how to arrange "the momentum of civil power" so that it acts on individuals, moving their passions in the proper direction (No. 13, pp. 92–93). Similarly, he argues that the national government’s powers to levy taxes and to raise and maintain an army ought to exist "without limitation" because it is impossible to foresee the extent and variety of national emergencies or the means necessary to meet them. This reasoning, he insists, is axiomatic, resting on such "simple" and "universal" truths as that "the means ought to be proportioned to the end." So though the principles of morals and politics do not have "the same degree of certainty with those of the mathematics," Publius assures his readers that