The Fiery Trial_ Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery - Eric Foner [112]
On the other hand, shortly after the battle of Bull Run on July 21, the war’s first significant encounter and a shocking defeat for the Union army, both houses approved by overwhelming margins a resolution affirming that the war was being waged solely to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and not “for the purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of these states.” Introduced in the House by John J. Crittenden of Kentucky and in the Senate by Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, the lone senator from a seceded state to remain in his seat, and supported by Lincoln, it passed the House, 117 to 2, on July 22, and the Senate, 30 to 5, three days later. According to James G. Blaine, the resolution accurately reflected “the popular sentiment throughout the North” in mid-1861. Presumably for this reason, James Ashley, George W. Julian, Owen Lovejoy, Thaddeus Stevens, and Charles Sumner, the leading Radicals in Congress, abstained rather than opposing it (a decision Ashley later called “the most cowardly act of my life”).17
The special session mainly concerned itself with fiscal and military matters. The question of “the future relations of the government with slavery,” Harper’s Weekly observed when Congress adjourned in August, had “by general consent” been postponed to December, when the members would reconvene. Yet the debates in July and August indicated that if Republicans did not see emancipation as the war’s “purpose,” many believed it might well become a consequence. Senator James H. Lane of Kansas warned that when “the army of freedom” penetrated the South, “it will be the tocsin…for an insurrection of the slaves.” To the alarm of border-state Unionists, even moderate Republicans like Senator James Dixon of Connecticut declared that if slavery interfered with the success of the war effort, “let slavery perish.” No one sought abolition, said the moderate Henry S. Lane of Indiana, but emancipation might well be “one of the results of the war.” This, he added, was “precisely the position of the administration.” Even Garrett Davis, the Unionist senator from Kentucky, who described himself as having “always been a pro slavery man,” informed Lincoln that if it came to a choice between preserving slavery or saving the Union, he would sacrifice slavery even if it meant that “another fibre of cotton should never grow in our country.”18
Especially after the fiasco at Bull Run, constituents inundated members of Congress with letters calling for invigoration of the war effort, a demand echoed in northern newspapers. Even moderate journals like the New York Times hinted that emancipation might become necessary to win the war. Reports also circulated of slaves “by the thousands” employed by Confederate armies. As the session neared adjournment, Congress on August 6 responded to this pressure by passing the Confiscation Act. Enacted over the objections of Democrats and border Unionists, it confiscated property (including slaves) utilized for Confederate military purposes and declared that the owner would “forfeit his claim” to any slave so employed.19
“This bill,” John J. Crittenden complained, “will be considered as giving an anti-slavery character and application to the war.” To be sure, as a measure of abolition it was extremely limited. The act confiscated individual slaves but did not affect the law of slavery. It said nothing about the status of the large majority of slaves within Union lines, who had not been employed by Confederate armies. An