The Fiery Trial_ Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery - Eric Foner [138]
In some ways the most striking feature of the Second Confiscation Act was its sharp distinction between the confiscation of other property and the emancipation of slaves. For most property it established a cumbersome judicial process that helps to explain why little land was actually seized and sold under its provisions. Yet the section freeing rebel-owned slaves who came within Union lines did not require court proceedings: it was self-enforcing. Slaves would become free, wrote the Springfield Republican, “as fast as the armies penetrate the Southern section.” Henceforth, the newspaper added, “every victory is a victory of emancipation.” To be sure, the number of slaves freed by the act would depend on how much Confederate territory the Union army succeeded in occupying. But to their critics, it seemed that Republicans were bent on the emancipation of “almost the entire slave population” of the United States.23
For all its ambiguities, the Second Confiscation Act embodied a major shift in national policy. Orville H. Browning, the Senate’s leading Republican critic of the bill, badgered Lincoln to veto it. The moment had arrived, he said, to decide whether the president “was to control the abolitionists and radicals, or whether they were to control him.” Lincoln responded that he wished Congress had not legislated on confiscation at all. But given that nearly all Republicans, unlike Browning, had voted for the bill, Lincoln was reluctant to disapprove it. Instead, he adopted an unusual course of action. Lincoln drafted a veto message outlining his objections. It criticized not only the permanent confiscation of the property of rebels but also the lack of any provision for determining whether runaway slaves belonged to Confederate or Unionist owners. Then, after asking Congress, which was about to adjourn, to remain in session an extra day, he met with a few members, including the influential Fessenden, and asked them to secure a resolution stating that the forfeiture of real estate would not extend beyond the life of the owner, as the Constitution required. Congress passed the resolution and then adjourned. On July 17, the same day that he approved the Militia Act, Lincoln signed the Second Confiscation Act, but also dispatched his draft veto message.24
Many members of Congress found Lincoln’s demand for a resolution and his decision to send a veto message without actually vetoing the bill “inexpressibly provoking.” The House refused to print extra copies of Lincoln’s message, the usual courtesy, and the Senate refused to print it at all. Nonetheless, once Lincoln signed the bill, all slaves of rebels who came within Union lines automatically became free. By the time Congress adjourned, Charles Sumner declared, the president and Congress agreed on two things: “The blacks are to be employed [in the military], and the slaves are to be freed.” Lincoln, wrote Harper’s Weekly, “has represented the average feeling of the people. Now as that feeling changes, we may expect a change of conduct on the part of the Administration.” And, in fact, a few days before he signed the Second Confiscation Act, Lincoln had embarked on a new approach to slavery and emancipation.25
When Lincoln decided to issue a proclamation of emancipation remains unknown. According to