The Ghost Mountain Boys - James E. Campbell [104]
The 32nd Division’s troops were sick and tired and poorly trained for war in the jungle, but that was no excuse for cowardice, MacArthur said, citing the reports of his operations staff officers.
“A real leader, “he insisted, “could take these same men and capture Buna.”
MacArthur continued, “Bob, the number of troops employed there is no indication of the importance I attach to this job…. The fact that I’ve sent for you, with your rank, indicates how much importance I attach to the taking of Buna…. Never did I think I’d see Americans quit.” MacArthur then told Eichelberger that he was to leave for the front the following morning because “time was of the essence.” The Japanese, MacArthur said, might send in reinforcements “any night.” Eichelberger was to relieve Harding and his subordinate commanders, or MacArthur threatened, “I will relieve them myself and you too.” MacArthur continued testily, “Go out there, Bob, and take Buna or don’t come back alive.” Then he added, “And that goes for your chief of staff, Clovis, too.”
At breakfast the following morning, MacArthur had apparently mellowed. Pulling Eichelberger aside, he wished him luck and god-speed and told him that he was “no use to him dead.” Eichelberger must have felt great relief. Just the day before, he had written Harding, his good friend and former West Point classmate, to express confidence in him.
But then MacArthur’s mood again turned cold. Promising to decorate him if he took Buna, MacArthur told Eichelberger that he was to push the battle regardless of casualties.
“That was our send-off,” Eichelberger later wrote, “and hardly a merry one.”
By 1:00 p.m. that same day, Eichelberger took command of all U.S. troops in the Buna area. The next day a medical officer reported to Eichelberger on the condition of his men. The troops, he said within earshot of General Harding, looked like “Christ off the cross.” Considering their depleted condition, he added, the men were carrying on heroically. It was difficult for Harding not to feel a degree of satisfaction. It was what he had been saying all along.
The men of the 32nd had been subsisting on short rations for well over a month. Because fires were not allowed at the front—the wet wood sent up billows of smoke and attracted too much attention—they ate their rations cold. Their feet swelled and bled. Their fingernails and toenails fell off. They were suffering from jungle rot, malaria, dengue fever, dysentery, ringworm, dehydration, and heat prostration. And there was a shortage of everything they needed to stay healthy—quinine, salt and chlorination tablets, bismuth, and vitamin pills. Because of the sand, mud, water, and humidity, they could not depend on their weapons either. BARs, M-1s, and machine guns jammed. When precious gun oil and patches reached the front, they came in large containers and were difficult to distribute. Spare parts were nearly impossible to find. Ammunition and medical supplies ran short. Soldiers who had lost their entrenching tools were still waiting for replacements.
As a consequence, the morale of the troops was low. To make matters worse, their battlefield successes were few. Although Stutterin’s Smith’s troops had punched a hole in the Japanese perimeter, the Japanese had not yielded much valuable ground. Their positions were impregnable and Harding’s troops lacked the weaponry to reduce them. Mortars, artillery, and air bombardments had proved to be largely ineffective. The only other possibility was for a soldier to rush a bunker and stick a grenade through a firing slit, a feat that took monumental courage and a lifetime of good luck. It was a heartbreaking, ridiculous way to bust a bunker. According to Stutterin’ Smith, “Many more failed than succeeded.”
The day after arriving at Dobodura, Eichelberger was eager to tour the front.
Eichelberger did not know it, but