The Ghost Mountain Boys - James E. Campbell [130]
When a company of the 127th pounded its way over hundreds of yards through Government Gardens, ending up on the coast near the coconut plantation, Eichelberger thought that perhaps his luck was changing. The Japanese quickly rallied, though, and surrounded the company, inflicting heavy losses. When reinforcements attempted to come to its rescue, they were ambushed, and an entire platoon was wiped out.
Eichelberger’s Christmas Day attack had been a mistake, and he wondered if Buna would become “an American military disaster.”
That night, returning to the command post, he found Sutherland waiting for him with disturbing news. The Australians, Sutherland said, were again mocking MacArthur. Despite a distinct numerical advantage, American troops had been unable to take Buna Government Station. Eichelberger argued that he had whole battalions—Stutterin Smith’s Ghost Mountain boys and White Smith’s men—that were no longer capable of fighting.
Sutherland then handed him a letter.
“What’s this?’ Eichelberger asked.
“MacArthur,” Sutherland answered.
Later, Eichelberger sat down to read the letter. Although MacArthur had never visited the battlefield, he was full of “Ivory Tower” advice, all of which revealed his ignorance of frontline conditions at Buna. Urging Eichelberger to use his superior numbers, he wrote:
Where you have a company on your firing line, you should have a battalion; and where you have a battalion, you should have a regiment. And your attacks, instead of being made up of two or three hundred rifles, should be made by two or three thousand…. It will be an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth…. Your battle casualties to date compared with your total strength are slight so that you have a big margin still to work with.
I beg of you to throw every ounce of energy you have into carrying out this word of advice from me, as I feel convinced that our time is strictly limited and that if results are not achieved shortly, the whole picture may radically change.
With the memory of December 5 still fresh, Eichelberger must have been taken aback by MacArthur’s letter. The general clearly wanted to see more casualties. It was a bloody calculus: dead and wounded soldiers were a sign of initiative.
Eichelberger’s command was in jeopardy, and he knew it, so he sat down and penned a reply to the general. He was pushing the offensive, he wrote, with the kinds of numbers he felt the situation necessitated. And his men were indeed fighting gallantly. “I hope you will not let any Australian generals talk down their noses at you.” Then he assured MacArthur that his men would “push on to victory.” His earlier notion of letting attrition do the dirty work was no longer even a consideration.
Late on Christmas night a Japanese submarine, having escaped prowling American PT boats, unloaded rations and ammunition at Buna Government Station and shelled Allied positions on the Warren Front.
On the morning of December 28, Sutherland again showed up at Eichelberger’s command post. This time, though, he arrived with good news: The 41st Division’s 163rd Regiment, a unit of fit, superbly trained National Guardsmen from Montana, had just reached Port Moresby, and soon it would be sent to the Urbana Front. It was exactly what Eichelberger needed to hear. The previous night, he had read MacArthur’s latest piece of fiction. It had left him fuming mad. “On Christmas Day,” the communiqué read, “our activities were limited to routine safety precautions. Divine services were held.”
Together, Eichelberger and Sutherland visited Colonel Grose’s command post. Grose informed Eichelberger that he was pulling out the 127th’s exhausted 3rd Battalion, which had made the Entrance Creek crossing and had born the brunt of the battle in Government Gardens.
Eichelberger’s response shocked him.
“No John,” Eichelberger replied. “That’s not the plan. This afternoon I want you to attack the station.”
Grose could not believe his ears, and asked for confirmation. When Eichelberger told him that was indeed