The Glorious Cause - Jeff Shaara [145]
Washington had placed Greene in command of the ground that faced the Hessians, with Sullivan on the right, anchoring the flank upstream. The Brandywine was crossed by several shallow fords, and toward Sullivan’s far flank, a crossing called Wistar’s Ford stood out boldly on the maps. Washington’s own map was drawn by Sullivan’s scouts, and showed that the next crossing beyond Wistar was twelve miles upstream, a far longer march than the British would make with the Americans so close. Washington was hopeful that Howe’s scouts would tell their commander that the American position was flawed, could easily be flanked from the Wistar crossing, or even from some of the fords closer in. If Howe read his maps, the strategy must be obvious to him, a plan that would recall the British flank attack on Long Island, Howe’s first major success of the war.
As the Hessians continued their futile artillery barrage, their troops showed no sign of making ready for anything but sitting tight, and it was becoming clear to Washington that Howe had ordered the Hessians to provide a grand show, a demonstration in force. Washington had offered the bait. It was the first sign that Howe had taken it.
Directly in front of the Hessians, Greene’s troops stood watch over two shallow fords on the creek, the crossings that the Hessians would certainly use if they launched an attack. On the far right, Washington had instructed Sullivan to prepare for the likelihood of Howe’s flanking attack. Washington had cautioned Sullivan to keep a sharp eye, to have scouting parties manning every crossroad, every ford where Howe’s troops might suddenly appear. If Howe could be convinced that he was springing a cleverly conceived trap, then Washington could spring a trap of his own. With the Hessians staying put across the creek, Washington could only wait for his own scouting reports, some confirmation that Howe had indeed divided his army. A game was afoot, and a mystery as well, Howe’s whereabouts still unknown, no sign from across the creek that the troops who faced him were anything but Hessians, no more than a third of Howe’s strength.
The first reports had finally come into camp at midmorning, word from upstream that a British column was marching north, toward the upper fords. He had read the paper with sweating hands, nervous excitement at the first real evidence that Howe was following the very plan that Washington had hoped for. If the scouts would continue to do their job, Washington knew that they would find the British troops, most likely Cornwallis’ men, exactly where he wanted him: on the march, vulnerable, spread out along the roads upstream. Sullivan had been ordered to make ready, prepare to drive his men across the fords and surprise the British before they could form any kind of defense. Sullivan’s attack need only hold the British in place, while Washington sprung his own trap on the Hessians. Once Howe’s march had been confirmed, Greene would lead a massive strike straight across the creek, a sudden roaring assault into and around the Hessians. Before Howe could react, Washington could rout the Hessians, and then, with Greene turning northward, the rest of Howe’s army would be surrounded.
All Washington needed now was the reports from the scouts, some confirmation of just where Howe and the rest of his army had gone.
GENERAL,
A large body of the enemy, from every account five thousand, with sixteen or eighteen fieldpieces marched along this road just now. . . . I believe General Howe is with this party . . .
It was the third dispatch that Sullivan had forwarded downstream, and each one brought the same piece of news. Sullivan’s scouts reported that