The Glorious Cause - Jeff Shaara [323]
If Cornwallis could not compel Lafayette to a general engagement, it did not mean the rebels could be ignored. Lafayette had learned from the triumphs of Washington, that the most effective fight he could make against Cornwallis was the quick burst, targeting the mistake, or tormenting the rear guard. While Cornwallis still believed Virginia lay open to occupation, with Lafayette dogging him at every turn, it would not be a simple conquest. Since the British infantry was vulnerable to the rebel annoyances, Cornwallis had one good alternative. He sent his horsemen after the rebels, Tarleton’s Legion, and the Queen’s Rangers, under John Simcoe. Simcoe was only slightly older than Tarleton, and nearly as cocky. The two units operated separately, and Cornwallis encouraged the rivalry with discreet prodding for each young horseman to outdo the other. But the results were unspectacular. Simcoe managed one minor clash that embarrassed von Steuben and his Virginia militia, while Tarleton nearly captured Governor Thomas Jefferson right out of Jefferson’s own home at Monticello. Their raids made for boisterous conversation and would certainly go far to enhance each man’s opinion of himself, but Cornwallis recognized their accomplishments for what they were: lost opportunities. Cornwallis had seen this all before, an ineffective campaign against rebels who were adept at biding their time, stretching out the campaign while the British exhausted their enthusiasm for the fight.
He still believed in the soundness of his strategy, that a large-scale offensive in Virginia could succeed at bringing the colony firmly under British control. Besides separating the Carolinas from contact with the northern colonies, Virginia was obviously an important source of food for rebels troops still gathering under Nathanael Greene. Cornwallis could not just sit quietly and allow a sound strategy to go wasting. In a forcefully worded letter, he suggested to Clinton that New York be abandoned, that Clinton move the main army to the Chesapeake. Against such a force, neither Lafayette nor Washington could save Virginia. The rebellion could be brought quite effectively to a close. Cornwallis believed resolutely in his plan. Henry Clinton had other ideas.
THE LETTERS HAD AWAITED HIM FROM HIS FIRST DAYS ON THE PENINSULA, arriving in small clusters. It was the disadvantage of distance, Clinton penning the letters days apart, Cornwallis received them in one mass all at the same time. He laid them out on the table, cocked his head toward O’Hara, said, “Would you suggest I read these in the order they were written, or would it be more prudent to relay them to you in the order of their insanity?”
He had lost his fear of speaking indiscreetly about his superior, emboldened by distance, of course, but more, by what seemed to be a collapse of Clinton’s ability to command. O’Hara was not as comfortable with Cornwallis’ whimsical attitude, said, “The most recent would be the most important, I would think. It would be a product of the latest information, would contain the orders that we would be expected to follow.”
Cornwallis ignored the minor admonition from O’Hara.
“All right then, General, but I should warn you. You will not appreciate the level of comedy under which I must function if all you hear is the latest order. No matter, here it is. June 28. We are to . . . embark that portion of the army which is available, and proceed with appropriate artillery and wagons, for the purpose of assaulting the rebel positions around Philadelphia. Once any resistance has been suitably dispatched and the rebel supply stores have been destroyed, the force will continue to New York, to reinforce the main body of the army.”
“Philadelphia?”
“Ah, see? I told you. As entertaining as we may find that order to be, it pales in comparison when taken out of its context. You see,