The Good Book_ A Secular Bible - A. C. Grayling [233]
10. Who will sacrifice his dearest friend for the sake of a farthing, and is as feeble and false in mind as a child or a madman.
11. These propositions are universally acknowledged as soon as they are uttered, but men differ about the degree or relative superiority of this or that good.
12. Some think that a moderate amount of virtue is enough, and they set no limit to their desires of wealth, property, power and reputation.
13. To whom we reply by an appeal to facts, which easily prove that people do not acquire or preserve virtue by the help of external goods, but external goods by the help of virtue;
14. And that happiness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both,
15. Is more often found with those who are most highly cultivated in their mind and in their character, and have only a moderate share of external goods,
16. Than among those who possess external goods to a useless extent, yet are deficient in higher qualities.
17. This is not only a matter of experience, but, if reflected upon, will easily appear to be in accordance with reason.
18. For, whereas external goods have a limit, like any other instrument,
19. And all things useful are of such a nature that where there is too much of them they must either do harm, or be of little use, to their possessors,
20. Yet every good of the mind, the greater it is, is also of greater use.
21. It is for the sake of the mind that goods external and goods of the body are eligible at all,
22. And all wise men ought to choose them for the sake of the mind, and not the mind for the sake of them.
23. Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much happiness as he has virtue and wisdom, and acts virtuously and wisely.
24. Herein lies the difference between good fortune and happiness;
25. For external goods come of themselves, and chance is the author of them,
26. But no one is just or temperate by or through chance.
27. In like manner, the happy state may be shown to be that which is best and which acts rightly;
28. And it cannot act rightly without doing right actions, and neither individual nor state can do right actions without virtue and wisdom.
29. Thus the courage, justice and wisdom of a state have the same form and nature as these qualities in an individual.
30. Let this then be the lawgiver’s first aim: to require of the state that it should be worthy of its best citizens,
31. And of its citizens that they should be just, wise and temperate.
Chapter 15
1. Philosophers who urge people to take lessons from them, but give no real instruction or advice, are like those who trim the lamps, but fail to pour in oil.
2. An understanding of life dedicated to affairs of state, of its practice and not merely its theory, requires a grasp of the precepts of statecraft.
3. At the basis of political activity there must be a strong foundation of judgement and reason,
4. So that choice of policy arises not from mere impulse due to empty opinion or contentiousness.
5. Some engage in public affairs but then weary of them or become disgusted by them,
6. But are not able to retire from them without difficulty;
7. They are in the same predicament as persons who have gone aboard a vessel to be rocked by the waves,
8. And then have been driven out into the open sea; they turn their gaze outside, seasick and much disturbed, but obliged to stay where they are and endure their plight.
9. Such people cast the greatest discredit upon public life by regretting their course and being unhappy.
10. Some, after hoping for glory, fall into disgrace or, after expecting to be feared by others on account of their power,
11. Are drawn into affairs which involve dangers and popular disorders.
12. But the person who has entered upon public life from conviction and reasoning, as the activity most befitting him and most honourable,
13. Is not frightened by any of these things, nor is his conviction changed.
14. Neither is it right to enter upon public life as a gainful trade, as did those who used