The Good Book_ A Secular Bible - A. C. Grayling [243]
13. And it appears that Themistocles, when he met with the same treatment from the Athenians, said,
14. ‘Why, my dear people, are you tired of receiving repeated benefits?’
15. Now of such sayings some are well said, others are not.
16. For so far as goodwill and solicitude for the common weal are concerned, a statesman should not hold aloof from any part of public affairs, but should pay attention to them all and inform himself about all details;
17. Nor should he hold himself aloof, waiting for the extreme necessities and fortunes of the state;
18. But perform other duties by means of different instruments operated by different agents,
19. Thus giving a turn or a twist to the instruments while they sit apart, as a ship’s captain makes use of sailors, lookout men and boatswains,
20. Some of whom they often call to the stern and entrust with the tiller,
21. Just so it is fitting that the statesman should yield office to others and should invite them to the orators’ platform in a gracious and kindly manner,
22. And he should not try to administer all the affairs of the state by his own speeches, decrees and actions,
23. But should have good, trustworthy men and employ each of them for each particular service according to his fitness.
24. So Pericles made use of Menippus for the position of general,
25. Humbled the Council of the Areopagus by means of Ephialtes,
26. Passed the decree against the Megarians by means of Charinus,
27. And sent Lampon out as founder of Thurii.
28. For, when power seems to be distributed among many, not only does the weight of hatreds and enmities become less troublesome,
29. But there is also greater efficiency in the conduct of affairs.
30. For just as the division of the hand into fingers does not make it weak, but renders it a more skilful instrument for use,
31. So the statesman who gives to others a share in the government makes action more effective by co-operation.
32. But he who through insatiable greed of fame or power puts the whole burden of the state upon himself,
33. And sets himself even to tasks for which he is not fitted by nature or by training,
34. As Cleon set himself to leading armies, Philopoemen to commanding ships and Hannibal to haranguing the people – such a man has no excuse when he makes mistakes.
35. So, being no persuasive speaker, you went on an embassy,
36. Or being easy-going, you undertook administration,
37. Being ignorant of accounting, you were treasurer,
38. Or when old and feeble, you took command of an army.
39. But Pericles divided the power with Cimon so that he should himself be ruler in the city and Cimon should man the ships and wage war against the barbarians;
40. For one of them was more gifted for civic government, the other for war.
41. And Eubulus the Anaphlystian also is commended because, although few men enjoyed so much confidence and power as he,
42. Yet he administered none of the Hellenic affairs and did not take the post of general,
43. But applied himself to the finances, increased the revenues, and did the state much good thereby.
Chapter 25
1. Since there is in every democracy an inclination to malice and fault-finding directed against men in public life,
2. And they suspect that many desirable measures, if there is no party opposition and no expression of dissent, are done by conspiracy,
3. And this subjects a man’s associations and friends to calumny,
4. Statesmen ought not to let any real enmity or disagreement against themselves subsist.
5. When the populace are suspicious about some important and salutary measure,
6. The statesmen when they come to the assembly ought not all to express the same opinion, as if by previous agreement,
7. But two or three of the friends should dissent and quietly speak on the other side, then change in their position as if they had been convinced;
8. For in this way they draw the people along with them, since they appear to be influenced only by the public advantage.
9. In small matters, however, which