The Good Book_ A Secular Bible - A. C. Grayling [321]
13. When we call an animal big or small, we always do so on the basis of comparing that animal and others of the same species;
14. And it is that comparison which regulates our judgement concerning its size.
15. Suppose this dog and that horse are the same size; we will wonder at the dog for being large, the horse for being small.
16. When I hear any dispute I always ask myself whether it is a question of comparison that is at issue;
17. And if it is, whether the disputants compare the same objects together, or talk of things that are widely different.
18. In forming our notions of human nature we are apt to compare men and animals, the only creatures endowed with thought that fall under our senses.
19. Certainly this comparison is favourable to mankind. In man we see a creature whose thoughts are not limited by narrow bounds of place or time;
20. Who carries his inquiries into the most distant regions of this globe, and beyond this globe, to the stars;
21. Who looks backward to consider the history of the human race;
22. Who casts his eye forward to see the influence of his actions on posterity,
23. And the judgement that will be made of his character a hundred or a thousand years hence;
24. We see a creature who traces causes and effects to a great length and intricacy,
25. Extracts general principles from particular appearances,
26. Improves his discoveries, corrects his mistakes and makes his errors profitable.
27. On the other side we see an animal – a being the very reverse of this, limited in its observations and reasonings to a few objects which surround it;
28. Without curiosity, without foresight; blindly conducted by instinct, and attaining, in a short time, its utmost perfection, beyond which it is unable to advance a single step.
29. Thus we see what a wide difference there is between humans and the other animals!
30. And how exalted a notion must we entertain of the former, in comparison to the latter therefore!
31. Yet there are two means commonly employed to destroy this conclusion:
32. First, by making an unfair representation of the case, and insisting only on the weaknesses of human nature,
33. And second, by forming a comparison between man and imagined beings of the most perfect wisdom.
34. Among the other excellencies of man, one is that he can form an idea of perfections much beyond what he has experience of in himself;
35. And therefore he is not limited in his conception of wisdom and virtue, but can imagine both in the greatest degree.
36. He can easily exalt his notions and conceive an extent of knowledge, which, when compared to his own, will make his own appear very contemptible,
37. And will cause the difference between human sagacity and that of animals almost to disappear.
38. Given that all the world agree that human understanding falls infinitely short of perfect wisdom,
39. It is proper we should know when this comparison takes place, that we may not dispute where there is no real difference in our sentiments.
40. Man falls much more short of perfect wisdom, and even of his own ideas of perfect wisdom, than animals do of man;
41. Yet the latter difference is so considerable that nothing but a comparison with the former can make it appear of little moment.
42. It is also usual to compare one person with another; and finding very few we can call wise or virtuous, we are apt to entertain a contemptuous notion of people in general.
43. To see the fallacy of this way of reasoning, we may observe that the honourable appellations of wise and virtuous are not annexed to any particular degree of those qualities of wisdom and virtue;
44. But arise only from the comparison we make between one person and another. When we find a man who attains an uncommon pitch of wisdom, we pronounce him wise:
45. So to say that there are few wise people in the world, is really to say nothing; since it is only by their scarcity that they merit that appellation.
46. Were the lowest of our kind as wise as the greatest that history contains, we should still have