The History of the Common Law of England [55]
abrogated many ill and inconvenient Usages, both in his Courts of Justice, and in the Country. He rectified and set in Order the Method of collecting his Revenue in the Exchequer, and removed obsolete and illeviable Parts thereof out of Charge; and by the Statutes of Westminster 1. and Westminster 2. Gloucester and Westminster 3. and of Articuli super Chartas, he did remove almost all that was either grievous or impractical out of the Law, and the Course of its Administration, and substituted such apt, short, pithy, and effectual Remedies and Provisions, as by the Length of Time, and Experience had of their Convenience, have stood ever since without any great Alteration, and are now as it were incorporated into, and become a Part of the Common Law itself. Upon the whole Matter, it appears, That the very Scheme, Mold and Model of the Common Law, especially in relation to the Administration of the Common Justice between Party and Party, as it was highly rectified and set in a much better Light and Order by this King than his Predecessors left it to him, so in a very great Measure it has continued the same in all succeeding Ages to this Day; so that the Mark or Epocha we are to take for the true Stating of the Law of England, what it is, is to be considered, stated and estimated from what it was when this King left it. Before his Time it was in a great Measure rude and unpolish'd, in comparison of what it was after his Reduction thereof; and on the other Side, as it was thus polished and ordered by him, so has it stood hitherto without any great or considerable Alteration, abating some few Additions and Alterations which succeeding Times have made, which for the most part are in the subject Matter of the Laws themselves, and not so much in the Rules, Methods, or ways of its Administration. As I before observed some of those many great Accessions to the Perfection of the Law under this King, so I shall now observe some of those Boxes or Repositories where they may be found, which are of the following Kiuds, viz. First, The Acts of Parliament in the Time of this King are full of excellent Wisdom and Perspicuity, yet Brevity; but of this, enough before is said. Secondly, The Judicial Records in the Time of this King. I shall not mention those of the Chancery, the Close-Patent and Charter Rolls, which yet will very much evidence the Learning and Judgment of that Time; but I shall mention the Rolls of Judicial Proceedings, especially those in the King's-Bench and Common-Pleas, and in the Eyres. I have read over many of them, and do generally observe, 1. That they are written in an excellent Hand. 2. That the Pleading is very short, but very clear and perspicuous, and neither loose or uncertain, nor perplexing the Matter either with Impropriety, Obscurity, or Multiplicity of Words: They are clearly and orderly digested, effectually representing the Business that they intend. 3. That the Title and the Reason of the Law upon which they proceed (which many times is expresly delivered upon the Record itself) is perspicuous, clear and rational; so that their short and pithy Pleadings and judgments do far better render the Sense of the Business, and the Reasons thereof, than those long, intricate, perplexed, and formal Pleadings, that oftentimes of late are unnecessarily used. Thirdly, The Reports of the Terms and Years of this King's Time, a few broken cases whereof are in Fitzherbert's Abridgment; but we have no successive Terms or Years thereof, but only ancient Manuscripts perchance, not running through the whole Time of this King, yet they are very good, but very brief: Either the Judges then spoke less, or the Reporters were not so ready handed as to take all they said. And hence this Brevity makes them the more obscure. But yet in those brief Interlocutions between the Judge and the Pleaders, and in their Definitions, there appears a great deal of Learning and Judgment. Some of those Reports, tho' broken, yet the best of their