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The Idea of Justice in Political Economy [14]

By Root 222 0
prevails through fear of reproach, of contempt, of social ostracism. Formal law only chooses the rules of social life most important for common interest, but enforces their observation, when necessary, through the physical compulsion which the whole can exercise over the individual. Internally of the same nature as morals and custom, i.e., originating equally in social ideals and primarily in the idea of justice, the law adopts through its external, formal nature the character of something independent, in consequence of which independence the law can only uphold justice within its own range and can only execute it in a certain sense. To the essence of right and law, as it has been evolved from religion, morals and customs by an experience of many thousand years, belongs above all the uniform and sure execution of the rules which have once been confirmed universally and uniformly. Without uniform application, without a sure administration, law does not remain law. To achieve this is extraordinary difficult, on account of the manifold complexity of life. The goal we can only reach by limiting ourselves to that which is of the most importance and by long, laborious, logical brain-work, which reduces the rules of law to a few clear and universally intelligible sentences. The exercise of the judicial power is raised by this quality above the level of personal feelings and changing disposition, laws are guided by it to a safe and uniform application. The more severely law interferes, subordinates details, proceeds radically and relentlessly, the more important this formal criterion grows. The uniform and just application of law becomes so important that the imperfect law whose just application is secured is preferred to the more perfect and materially more just law whose application varies, becomes uncertain and thus unjust everywhere or in the hands of judges and officials of to-day. Nearly. all positive law, therefore, and especially written law; which the thinking mind generates by the machinery of legislation, which has not as customary law been derived from use, is inflexible, feeble, confined to outward, clearly visible marks; it cannot regard individualities and their natures, it deals with rough averages. Instead of testing individuals, for example, it divides adults and minors according to a fixed age, approximately correct for the totality, but more or less arbitrary in regard to the individual. It calls all adult men to the polls, not because they are really of equal importance to the commonwealth, but because the application of every more complicated distinction would result practically in greater injustices. Thus law becomes often inequitable and materially unjust, not because formal justice is superior, but because it is more easily attained in the existing stage of civilization. This gives rise to thousands of conflicts between material and formal - justice, which are so often decisive for the practical questions of distribution of wealth and incomes. If there is any demand of justice which it is desired to introduce into our institutions through the channel of ordinary reform by positive law, it is not only necessary that the demand be recognized and desired by the best as right, that it must have become custom in certain places, that it must have overcome the resisting powers of egoism, of listless indolence which clings to tradition, that it should have triumphed over the eventual obstruction of the other ethical ideas, which tending toward other goals, often may be an obstacle, that it should have become a dogma of ruling parties and statesmen. No, it must also have evolved the qualities of a practicable formal law, it must have reached fixed boundaries, clear characteristics, determined qualities and proportions; it must have traversed the long journey from a conception of right to a clearly defined and limited provision of law, the fundamental judgments of value must be condensed to a fixed conventional scale, which, as a simple expression of complicated and manifold conditions still grasps their
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