The Kennedy Men_ 1901-1963 - Laurence Leamer [406]
Adzhubei may have exaggerated Kennedy’s comments, but by all accounts the president did in fact mention Hungary. That was a foolishly provocative analogy to throw out. By its covert activities and military provocations, the Kennedy administration had given Castro and Khrushchev every reason to believe that Cuba was about to be invaded. After reading his son-in-law’s report, Khrushchev took a serious new look at Cuban security, beginning by having the Presidium, the Soviet leadership committee, approve a new $133 million package of military assistance.
In May 1962, the Soviet leader decided that he would further protect Castro by placing nuclear missiles on the island. In doing so, he would also buttress his nation’s position against an America far superior in military strength. Although historians debate why the Russian leader would propose such a daring and dangerous move, what remains indisputable is that the massive CIA operations in south Florida and the feints of Operation Mongoose provided profound political justifications. Without those ceaseless efforts and Castro’s legitimate fears that he was about to be invaded, Khrushchev would undoubtedly never have made such an offer, and even if he had, Castro very probably would not have accepted it.
Castro was not a hand puppet moving every time Khrushchev wiggled his thumb or index finger, and the Soviet leader was right in believing that he would have to convince the Cuban leader of the efficacy of dotting the landscape of Cuba with such deadly weaponry. “Tell Fidel that there is no other way out,” Khrushchev admonished his delegation as they set out to Cuba. He would secretly place the weapons in Cuba. Then at the end of November, after the American elections, Khrushchev would arrive on the island, sign a new treaty with Castro, and announce to the world that Cuba was now safe from invasion. It was a provocative action, but Khrushchev and Castro had their justifications. In its way, politics follows Newton’s third law of motion: every action creates an equal or opposite reaction. Whether a man is a Communist or a capitalist, if you burn his fields, sabotage his ships, destroy his goods, poison his wells, and attempt to kill his leader, sooner or later he will react, and he will be a different kind of enemy than when it all began.
Through its many sources, the CIA had been receiving information suggesting a major buildup of Soviet activity in Cuba. The United States had counted up to twenty Soviet freighters arriving with military equipment by August 22, and five more seemed to be on the way from Black Sea ports. Large numbers of Russian civilians had arrived as well. Secret military construction was going on in various places around the island. Since the Soviets were usually parsimonious with their client states in their economic commitments and military aid, the CIA concluded “these developments amount to the most extensive campaign to bolster a non-bloc country ever undertaken by the USSR.”
On August 23, President Kennedy met with his top national security advisers to discuss the dramatically increased Soviet presence. CIA Director John McCone called for aggressive new action, including as the strongest alternative “the instantaneous commitment of sufficient armed forces to occupy the country, destroy the regime, free the people, and establish in Cuba a peaceful country which will be a member of the community of American states.” Secretary of State Dean Rusk came up with his own aggressive suggestion: to use the American base at Guantánamo Bay as a staging ground for sabotage.
Kennedy and his associates mused about what this Soviet action might have to do with Turkey, Greece, Berlin, and other trouble spots. McCone brought up the Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy that so rankled Khrushchev. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara listened to McCone and then made the point