The Key to Rebecca - Ken Follett [59]
At the end he added AR for Message Finished and K for Over. They replied with a series of R’s, which meant: “Your message has been received and understood.”
Wolff packed away the radio, the core book and the key, then he poured himself another drink.
All in all, he thought he had done incredibly well.
10
THE SIGNAL FROM THE SPY WAS ONLY ONE OF TWENTY OR THIRTY REPORTS ON the desk of von Mellenthin, Rommel’s Ic—intelligence officer—at seven o’clock on the morning of June 4. There were several other reports from listening units: infantry had been heard talking to tanks au clair; field headquarters had issued instructions in low-grade codes which had been deciphered overnight; and there was other enemy radio traffic which, although indecipherable, nevertheless yielded hints about enemy intentions simply because of its location and frequency. As well as radio reconnaissance there were the reports from the Ics in the field, who got information from captured weapons, the uniforms of enemy dead, interrogation of prisoners and simply looking across the desert and seeing the people they were fighting. Then there was aerial reconnaissance, a situation report from an order-of-battle expert and a summary—just about useless—of Berlin’s current assessment of Allied intentions and strength.
Like all field intelligence officers, von Mellenthin despised spy reports. Based on diplomatic gossip, newspaper stories and sheer guesswork, they were wrong at least as often as they were right, which made them effectively useless.
He had to admit that this one looked different.
The run-of-the-mill secret agent might report: “9th Indian Brigade have been told they will be involved in a major battle in the near future,” or: “Allies planning a breakout from the Cauldron in early June,” or: “Rumors that Auchinleck will be replaced as commander in chief.” But there was nothing indefinite about this report.
The spy, whose call sign was Sphinx, began his message: “Operation Aberdeen.” He gave the date of the attack, the brigades involved and their specific roles, the places they would pounce, and the tactical thinking of the planners.
Von Mellenthin was not convinced, but he was interested.
As the thermometer in his tent passed the 100-degree mark he began his routine round of morning discussions. In person, by field telephone and—rarely—by radio, he talked to the divisional Ics, the Luftwaffe liaison officer for aerial reconnaissance, the Horch Company liaison man and a few of the better brigade Ics. To all of these men he mentioned the 9th and 10th Indian Brigades, the 22nd Armored Brigade, and the 32nd Army Tank Brigade. He told them to look out for these brigades. He also told them to watch for battle preparations in the areas from which, according to the spy, the counter-thrust would come. They would also observe the enemy’s observers: if the spy were right, there would be increased aerial reconnaissance by the Allies of the positions they planned to attack, namely Aslagh Ridge, Sidra Ridge and Sidi Muftah. There might be increased bombing of those positions, for the purpose of softening up, although this was such a giveaway that most commanders would resist the temptation. There might be decreased bombing, as a bluff, and this too could be a sign.
These conversations also enabled the field Ics to update their overnight reports. When they were finished von Mellenthin wrote his report for Rommel, and took it to the command vehicle. He discussed it with the chief of staff, who then presented it to Rommel.
The morning discussion was brief, for Rommel had made his major decisions and given his orders for the day during the previous evening. Besides, Rommel was not in a reflective mood in the mornings: he wanted action. He tore around the desert, going from one front-line position to another in his staff car or his Storch aircraft,