The Looming Tower - Lawrence Wright [257]
“Al-Zawahiri Yarud ’Ala Bush Bibayan Khasa bihee Filisteen” [Al-Zawahiri Responds to Bush in a Statement Specific on Palestine]. Translated by Amjad M. Abu Nseir. Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel. www.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2001/11/11-10-3.htm.
al-Zayyat, Montassir. Al-Jamaat al-Islamiyya: Nathra Dakhiliyah [Islamic Groups: An Internal View]. Translated by Amjad M. Abu Nseir. Al-Hayat, January 10-14, 2005.
——. Ayman al-Zawahiri Kama ’Araftahoo [Ayman al-Zawahiri as I Knew Him]. Translated by Amjad M. Abu Nseir. Cairo: Dar Misr al-Mahroosa, 2002.
——. The Road to al-Qaeda: The Story of bin Laden’s Right-Hand Man. London: Pluto Press, 2004.
AKNOWLEDGMENTS AND NOTES ON SOURCES
LIES AND DECEPTION always pose a problem to a journalist who is trying to construct a truthful narrative, and in a project that largely relies on interviews with jihadis and intelligence operatives, the reader can suppose that there is a danger in placing too much trust in such sources. To complicate matters further, the early scholarship on the subject of al-Qaeda and the personalities that populate it was often shoddy and misleading. The Arabic press, which is essential to a chronicler of the lives of Zawahiri and bin Laden, is bridled by the autocratic governments in the region. Nor can one put too much faith in sworn testimony by witnesses who have already proved themselves to be crooks, liars, and double agents. How, then, does the writer choose which story to tell among so many conflicting and untrustworthy accounts?
Fortunately, some useful documents have surfaced in the five years since 9/11 that provide a reference for journalists who are looking for solid footing. Particularly helpful are “Tareek Osama” (the history of Osama), a collection of memos, letters, and notes that were taken from an al-Qaeda computer captured in Bosnia and entered into evidence in United States v. Enaam Arnout; a trove of e-mails and other correspondence that Wall Street Journal reporter Alan Cullison fortuitously acquired when he purchased what turned out to be a looted al-Qaeda computer in Kabul; and the important official papers of al-Qaeda, including its constitution and bylaws, many of which were gathered by the United States Department of Defense after the war in Afghanistan and form what is called the Harmony Documents. These items provide a bedrock of reliable information that can be useful in testing the trustworthiness of other sources.
Even these valuable materials can be misleading, however. For instance, the handwritten notes in “Tareek Osama” that record the critical meeting on August 11, 1988, when the term al-Qaeda first surfaces, give us a peek at what appears to be the moment of creation. As such, it is an essential scene in my narrative. However, the English translation that was provided to the court is often confounding. “I see that we should think in the origin of the idea we came for from the beginning,” it says early on. “All this to start a new fruit from below zero.” A better translation of this passage would be: “We should focus on the idea that brought us here in the first place. All this to start a new project from scratch.” According to the document, the secretary who recorded these notes was bin Laden’s friend Abu Rida al-Suri (Mohammed Loay Baizid), but when I interviewed him in Khartoum, he denied that he was even in Afghanistan or Pakistan in 1988. I don’t know the truth of his assertion, but his name is on the document. Wa’el Julaidan, who refused to talk to me face-to-face, was in this meeting, and he agreed to answer my questions through an intermediary. He provided the surprising information that it was Abdullah Azzam who called it in the first place; he also gave me the names of the participants and described a vote that was taken at the end of the meeting on the formation of al-Qaeda. None of that is in the court documents. Medani al-Tayeb, who was al-Qaeda’s treasurer, told me through an intermediary that the organization had already been formed before the August 11 meeting