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SUTTA 17

223 The pattern on which §§3–6 are constructed may be stated simply as follows:

no progress and requisites are scarce = depart;

no progress and requisites are plentiful = depart;

progress and requisites are scarce = stay;

progress and requisites are plentiful = stay.

224 The same pattern is applied in §§7–22 to village, town, city, and country.

225 PTS, in reading here anāpucchā, “without taking leave,” seems to be mistaken. BBS and SBJ read āpucchā, “after taking leave,” which seems more fitting. As the person on whom the bhikkhu relied—presumably a teacher or a lay supporter—provided the requisites in adequate measure, courtesy requires that the bhikkhu take leave of him before departing.

SUTTA 18

226 Da˚ḍapāni, whose name means “stick-in-hand,” was so called because he used to walk around ostentatiously with a golden walking stick, even though he was still young and healthy. According to MA, he sided with Devadatta, the Buddha’sarch foe, when the latter attempted to create a schism in the Buddha’s following. His manner of asking the question is arrogant and deliberately provocative.

227 The first part of the Buddha’s reply directly counters Da˚ḍapāni’s aggressive attitude. MA quotes in this connection SN 22:94/iii.138: “Bhikkhus, I do not dispute with the world, it is the world that disputes with me. A speaker of Dhamma does not dispute with anyone in the world.” The second part may be taken to mean that, for the arahant (spoken of here as “that brahmin” with reference to the Buddha himself), perceptions no longer awaken the dormant underlying tendencies to defilements, to be enumerated in §8.

228 This response seems to be an expression of frustration and bewilderment.

229 The interpretation of this cryptic passage hinges on the word papañca and the compound papañca-saññā-sankhā. Ñm had translated the former as “diversification” and the latter as “calculations about perceptions of diversification.” It seems, however, that the primary problem to which the term papañca points is not “diversification,” which may be quite in place when the sensory field itself displays diversity, but the propensity of the worldling’s imagination to erupt in an effusion of mental commentary that obscures the bare data of cognition. In a penetrative study, Concept and Reality in Early Buddhism, Bhikkhu Ñā˚ananda explains papañca as “conceptual proliferation,” and I follow him in substituting “proliferation” for Ñm’s “diversification.” The commentaries identify the springs of this proliferation as the three factors—craving, conceit, and views—on account of which the mind “embellishes” experience by interpreting it in terms of “mine,” “I” and “my self.” Papañca is thus closely akin to maññanā, “conceiving,” in MN 1—see n.6.

The compound papañca-saññā-sankhā is more problematic. Ven. Ñā˚ananda interprets it to mean “concepts characterised by the mind’s prolific tendency,” but this explanation still leaves the word saññā out of account. MA glosses sankhā by koṭṭhāsa, “portion,” and says that saññā is either perception associated with papañca or papañca itself. I go along with Ñā˚ananda in taking sankhā to mean concept or notion (Ñm’s “calculation” is too literal) rather than portion. My decision to treat saññā-sankhā as a dvanda compound, “perceptions and notions ,” may be questioned, but as the expression papañca-saññā-sankhā occurs but rarely in the Canon and is never verbally analysed, no rendering is utterly beyond doubt. On alternative interpretations of its components, the expression might have been rendered “notions [arisen from] the proliferation of perceptions” or “perceptual notions [arisen from] proliferation.”

The sequel will make it clear that the process of cognition is itself “the source through which perceptions and notions [born of] mental proliferation beset a man.” If nothing in the process of cognition is found to delight in, to welcome, or to