• Choose a category
• All
• Classic-Fiction

By Root 5826 0

̄ is ambiguous here. MA interprets it as meaning good states, which it identifies with serenity and insight (samatha-vipassanā) thus in its paraphrase of the text: “I teach, bhikkhus, even the abandoning of desire and attachment to such peaceful and sublime states as serenity and insight, how much more so to that low, vulgar, contemptible, coarse, and impure thing that this foolish Ariṭṭha sees as harmless when he says that there is no obstruction in desire and lust for the five cords of sensual pleasure.” The commentator cites MN 66.26–33 as an example of the Buddha teaching the abandonment of attachment to serenity, MN 38.14 as an example of his teaching the abandonment of attachment to insight. Note that in each case it is the attachment to the good states that should be abandoned, not the good states themselves.

Despite MA, it seems to me that dhammā here signifies, not good states themselves, but the teachings, the correct attitude to which was delineated just above in the simile of the snake. The simile of the raft thus intimates that even the teachings that are to be rightly grasped must finally be relinquished. This, however, is not an invitation to moral nihilism, but a warning that even attachment to the noble teachings is an obstacle to progress. What is contrary to the teachings, adhammā, would include the moral laxity that the bhikkhu Ariṭṭha advocated.

256 This section evidently has the purpose of forestalling another type of misconception and misrepresentation of the Dhamma, i.e., the introduction of a view of self into the teaching. According to MA, standpoints for views (diṭṭhiṭṭhāna) are wrong views themselves as grounds for other more elaborate wrong views; the objects of views, i.e., the five aggregates; and the conditions for views, i.e., such factors as ignorance, perverted perception, and false thoughts, etc.

257 MA states that the notion “this is mine” is induced by craving, the notion “this I am” by conceit, and the notion “this is my self” by wrong views. These three—craving, conceit, and views—are called the three obsessions (gāha). They are also the mainsprings behind conceiving (MN 1) and mental proliferation (MN 18).

258 This series of terms shows the aggregate of consciousness indirectly, by way of its object. The “seen” points to eye-consciousness, the “heard” to ear-consciousness, the “sensed” to the other three kinds of sense consciousness, and the remaining terms to mind-consciousness.

259 This is a full-fledged eternalist view arisen on the basis of one of the earlier, more rudimentary types of personality view; here it becomes itself an object of craving, conceit, and the false view of self. This view seems to reflect the philosophy of the Upanishads, which assert the identity of the individual self (ātman) with the universal spirit (brahman), though it is difficult to determine on the basis of the texts whether the Buddha was personally acquainted with the early Upanishads themselves.

260 Asati na paritassati. The noun form paritassanā, according to MA, has the twofold connotation of fear and craving, thus “agitation” was chosen as comprehending both. Agitation about what is non-existent externally (§18) refers to the worldling’s despair over the loss or non-acquisition of possessions; agitation about what is non-existent internally (§20) to the eternalist’s despair when he misinterprets the Buddha’s teaching on Nibbāna as a doctrine of annihilation.

261 Pariggahaṁ parigaṇheyyātha, lit. “you may possess that possession.” This links up with §18 on agitation about external possessions.

262 Attavādupādānaṁ upādiyetha, lit. “you may cling to that clinging to a doctrine of self.” On the problem this idiom involves for translation, see n.176. This passage links up with §20 on agitation arising from a view of self.

263 The support of views (dị̣hinissaya), according to MA, is the sixty-two views mentioned in the Brahmajāla Sutta (DN 1), which emerge from personality view or “doctrine of a self.” It might also include the pernicious view adopted by