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The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha - Bhikkhu Nanamoli [609]

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four jhānas. The Pug definition merely substitutes the eight liberations for “those liberations…transcending forms.”

704 Kāyasakkhin. MA: This type includes the six individuals—from the one established in the fruit of stream-entry up to the one on the path of arahantship—who first contact the (immaterial) jhānas and subsequently realise Nibbāna. Ṃ stresses that one or another of the immaterial attainments including cessation is needed to qualify as kāyasakkhin. The Pug definition merely substitutes the eight liberations.

705 ̣Diṭṭhipatta. MA says that this type includes the same six individuals included under kāyasakkhin—from the stream-enterer to the one on the path of arahantship—but without possession of the Pug defines him as one who has understood the Four Noble Truths and who has reviewed and examined with wisdom the teachings proclaimed by the Tathāgata.

706 Saddhāvimutta. MA says that this type too includes the same six. Pug defines him in the same way as it defines the diṭṭhipatta, but adds that he has not reviewed and examined the teachings with wisdom to the same extent that the diṭṭhipatta has.

707 MA says that this type, the dhammānusārin, and the next, the saddhānusārin, are individuals on the path of stream-entry, the former with predominance of wisdom, the latter with predominance of faith. For more on these two types, see n.273.

708 MA: With the mental body he realises Nibbāna, the ultimate truth, and he penetrates it with the wisdom pertaining to the supramundane path.

709 That is, these bhikkhus have not had the faith required to undertake the training laid down for them by the Buddha.

710 MA says that the “four-phrased statement” (catuppadaṁ veyyākaraṇaṁ) is the teaching of the Four Noble Truths. However, no mention is made here of the four truths. Possibly, the four-phrased statement is the resolution on effort just below, with each clause counting as a phrase (the conditional clause being taken as two phrases).

711 MA: By this the Buddha shows that the ideal disciple practises by arousing his energy and resolving: “I shall not rise up so long as I have not attained arahantship.”

SUTTA 71

712 This sutta and the following two seem to present a chronological account of Vacchagotta’s spiritual evolution. The Saṁyutta Nikāya contains a whole section of short discussions between the Buddha and Vacchagotta, SN 33/iii.257–62. See also SN 44:7–11/iv.391–402.

713 This is the type of omniscience that the Jain teacher the Niga˚ṭha Nātaputta claims at MN 14.17.

714 MA explains that even though part of the statement is valid, the Buddha rejects the entire statement because of the portion that is invalid. The part of the statement that is valid is the assertion that the Buddha is omniscient and all-seeing; the part that is excessive is the assertion that knowledge and vision are continuously present to him. According to the Theravāda exegetical tradition the Buddha is omniscient in the sense that all knowable things are potentially accessible to him. He cannot, however, know everything simultaneously and must advert to whatever he wishes to know. At MN 90.8 the Buddha says that it is possible to know and see all, though not simultaneously, and at AN 4:24/ii.24 he claims to know all that can be seen, heard, sensed, and cognized. This is understood by the Theravāda commentators as an assertion of omniscience in the qualified sense. See too in this connection Miln 102–7.

715 MA explains “the fetter of householdership” (gihisȧyojana ) as attachment to the requisites of a householder, which Ṃ details as land, ornaments, wealth, grain, etc. MA says that even though the texts mention some individuals who attained arahantship as laymen, by the path of arahantship they destroyed all attachment to worldly things and thus either went forth as monks or passed away immediately after their attainment. The question of lay arahants is discussed at Miln 264.

716 On the Ājı̄vakas see n.73.

717 Since this Ājı̄vaka believed in the moral efficacy of action, he could

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